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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Hem was given a driver's license suspension as a result of his failure of a breath test on
April 6, 2013, pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002A. The license suspension began on April 6, 2013, with
a temporary license being good for thirty days. The hearing was set for May 9, 2013, over the
objection of Mr. Hem. This is an appeal from the decision of the district court upholding the ALS
hearing officer's decision to suspend Mr. Hem's license.
Party Reference:

The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as "ITD" or

"Department" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Hern is referred to by name. Idaho State
Police Forensic Services is referred to as "ISP" or "ISPFS."
Standard for Review: In Dru/fell v. State Department of Transportation, 136 Id. 853, 41

P.3d 739 (2002), the Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the
judicial reviews of administrative proceedings, the Court stated:
"Under the IDAPA, the ITD's decision may be overturned only where its findings:
a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the agency's statutory
authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by substantial
evidence in the record; ore) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC.
Section 67-5279(3).
At p. 855. See also Idaho Transportation Departmentv. Van Camp, Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL
2086512 (Id. App.) and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 153 Id. 200,280 P.3d
703 (2012).
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LC. § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing Officer that
driving privileges should be reinstated. The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to
the agency record for judicial review. LC. §67-5277. LC. §67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review.

Bennettv. State ofIdaho, DepartmentofTransportation, 147 Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009).
The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
presented. Upon judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's order a Court may not set
aside findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial evidence on the Record as a
whole" LC. §67-5279(3)(d). Mahurin v. State ofIdaho, Department of Transportation, 140 Id. 65,
99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also Gibbar v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937,
155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006).
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is:" ... if the
agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded for further proceedings
as necessary." I.C. §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must
be affirmed, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's
authority, is made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department, 137 Id. 337;
48 P.3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency
erred in a manner specified in LC. §67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been
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prejudiced. Gibbar v, State of Idaho, Department a/Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176,
(Id. App. 2006) and Idaho Transportation Department v. Van Camp, supra.
A hearing pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative
regulation is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id.
164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011) at p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's
license.

See LC. §§ 49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2).

Bell v, Idaho Department of

Transportation, 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d. 1030 (2011).
IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDING
Mr. Hem was driving in Lewiston, Idaho, on April 5, 2013, at which time he was stopped
for making an improper right hand turn by turning from G Street into the second northbound lane
of 18th Street instead of the closest northbound lane. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at pp. 4-5,
The Trooper acknowledged several mistakes in the course of this DUI contact and
had acknowledged that this was his first DUI stop. Clerk's Exhibit I Tr. at pp. 11-13. This is why
the Trooper had a training officer, Trooper Travis Hight, with him. Clerk's Exhibit 1 Tr. at p. 13-14.
The Trooper noted that Mr. Hern has no slurred speech, no impaired memory, and no glassy
bloodshot eyes. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R .at p. 5. After the conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Mr.
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Hem was arrested and transported to the Nez Perce County Jail. A breath test was performed using
the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 3.
The Trooper indicates that he played the CD format of the Notice of Suspension. Clerk's
Exhibit 1 Tr. at p. 31. The date of the arrest on the Notice of Suspension is 4-5-2013. The date of
service is 4-6-2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 1. However, the Trooper indicated that he did not
actually serve Mr. Hern with the Notice of Suspension nor did he serve him with the citation. These
documents were simply given to the jail staff. Clerk's Exhibit 1 Tr. at pp. 11-12.
On the second page of the Notice of Suspension, the language that the ITD put in its notice
is as follows:

If you request a hearing, it shall be held within twenty (20) days of the date the
hearing request was received by the Idaho Transportation Department (Section 188002A, Idaho Code).
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 2.
A Request for Hearing was generated April 9, 2013, and sent to the Idaho Transportation
Department of behalf of Mr. Hern. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 20. Other documents were also
forwarded to the Department. Requests for subpoenas for the breath testing specialist, arresting
officer, log sheets, and video were also made. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 27. A Motion for
Discovery Order was also made. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 29. An Objection to Administrative
Notice was also filed with the Department. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 32. Notice of Appearance was
also filed. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 34. A Request for Discovery was filed. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R.
at p. 36.
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The Idaho Transportation Department generated documents on April 15, 2013, regarding this
case, six days after the request for hearing. There is no explanation in the record why the hearing
officer waited six days. The 9th of April, 2013 was a Tuesday and the 15 th of April was a Monday.
A subpoena was issued to Andrew Schoonmaker noting the hearing was set for May 9, 2013, at 2:00
p.rn. MST. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 52. A subpoena was issued for the video noting that the
material had to be received by ITD on April 29, 2013. The subpoenaed material had to be sent to
ITD and not the driver or his counsel even though the subpoena was issued based on the request of
the driver. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 53. An Instrument Log Sheet subpoena was also issued on April
15, 2013, with a received date of April 29, 2013. Again, the information had to be sent to ITD.
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 55. On April 15, 2013, the hearing officer issued subpoenas for evidence
he deemed relevant and denied the request for any other subpoenaed information. Clerk's Exhibit
2 R. atp. 59.
The Department issued its Notice of Telephone Hearing on April 15, 2013, noting that the
hearing would be conducted by telephone on May 9, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 93. The
hearing officer also issued a Show Cause letter which states as follows:
"The Department received your hearing request in a timely matter and forwarded the
required documents to the hearing examination section. The hearing examiner has
extended the hearing date pursuant to I.C. 18-8002A(7), do to:
(xxx) allow time for the receipt of subpoenaed evidence requested by the Petitioner."
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 94.
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The Instrument Log Sheet was received by the Department on April 17, 2013. Clerk's
Exhibit 2 R. at p. 75 and sent to Counsel on April 18, 20103. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 109. The
evidence report was received by the Department on April 19, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 110.
A notice to the hearing officer was sent indicating that Clark and Feeney had received the log sheets,
police reports, and video by April 24, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 111. The Affidavit of Service
for the subpoena of the audio/video notes service on April 16, 2012. Obviously, it should be 2013
because the notary notes April 17, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 68.
There is no explanation in this record as to why the hearing officer waited six (6) days to
issue the subpoenas. The hearing officer did not have a Show Cause Hearing even thought it was
requested and his decision as to good cause was objected to on this record. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at
p. 63. The hearing was held on May 9, 2013. The hearing officer issued his decision on May 24,
2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at pp. 118-139.
As a result of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the license suspension. Mr. Hern
filed a timely request for judicial review. The district court had oral argument on May 14, 2014. A
decision was filed on June 23, 2014. Clerk's Record at p. 539. A Notice of Appeal was filed on June
26, 2014. Clerk's Record at p. 549.
The administrative hearing record is found at Clerk's Exhibit 2 while the ALS hearing
transcript is found at Clerk's Exhibit 1.
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V.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

The Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol Testing Are Not Rules and
the Agency Action Resting on the Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol
Testing must Be Set Aside.
(A)

The Hern and Nauert Decisions

(B)

The Standard Operating Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing Issued By
The ISP Lack The Force And Effect Of Law

(C)

There Is No Evidence The Idaho State Police Engaged In Proper Rulemaking
Procedure In Compliance With IAP A When It Issued The Standard Operating
Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing

II.

There was No Due Process in Mr. Hem's ALS Hearings

III.

The Actions of the Hearing Officer Violate Mr. Hem's Equal Protection Rights.
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VI.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR BREATH ALCOHOL
TESTING ARE NOT RULES AND THE AGENCY ACTION RESTING ON THE
STANDARD OPERA TING PROCEDURES FOR BREATH ALCOHOL
TESTING MUST BE SET ASIDE.
A. The Hern and Nauert Decisions
In State v. Hern, Nez Perce County Case No. CV 13-01106, Judge Brudie issued a decision
regarding the SOP and the requirement for rulemaking. Judge Brudie found as follows:
"Petitioner Hern contends that, if the SOP's (sic) are not rules, then they are merely
guidelines, and do not have the full force and effect of law. The Court does not
disagree with Hem's premises. However, the Court finds the SOP's (sic) are not
intended by ISP or the legislature to be rules, nor or they intended to have the full
force and effect of law."

Hern Opinion R. at p. 544.
However, the ISPFS and the State of Idaho have, in the past few months, recognized that
rule-making is required. On September 2, 2014, the State enacted IDAP A Rules for breath testing.
The Notice of Rulemaking - Temporary and Proposed Rule has for its justification the following:
"The need for the temporary rule change is due to ongoing criminal cases and appeals
in the Idaho judicial system to suppress blood alcohol results based on the current
process of having the rules governing breath alcohol testing in ISP Forensic Services'
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) rather than administrative rule. If the breath
alcohol results are suppressed by the courts because of the current wording,
DUI cases with breath test results would not be able to be prosecuted in Idaho.
Not prosecuting DUI cases presents a significant public safety threat." (emphasis
added)
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A copy of the Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The State ofldaho has specifically
recognized that without breath testing standards that are properly promulgated, the ISP Forensic
Services' SOP has no force and effect of law. Dennis Stevenson, the State Administrative Rules
Coordinator, Department of Administration, in an e-mail sent to Matthew Garnette, who is the head
of the Forensic Services for ISP, noted as follows:
"Hello Matthew, Unfortunately. I think Judge Stegner got it right. The SOP manual
is not an internal management document per se. As the judge pointed, the SOP does
affect the rules of evidence which, in tum, affect the rights of the public.
Because the SOP is not incorporated by reference, it does not have the force and
effect of the law. One of the definitions of a rule is the practice or procedure
requirements of an agency, and, in this case, these procedures affect the private rights
of the public or the procedures available to the public and, as such, must be put into
a rule to be enforceable.
That's my 2 cents worth.
Best regards,
Dennis Stevenson" (emphasis added)
A copy of the e-mail generated by Mr. Garnette and Mr. Stevenson is attached to this brief as Exhibit
"B". The State ofldaho has specifically recognized that Judge Brudie was wrong. The e-mail from
Dennis Stevenson and Matthew Garnette was received by Counsel pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Request.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a copy of page 1 the House Bill 284 in which the legislature
chose to add what is now subsection 3 of LC. § l 8-8002A. The legislature noted the reason for the
amendment: "To provide rulemaking authority of the Department of Law Enforcement ... " The
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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legislature generated a specific and entirely new subsection 3 to LC. § I 8-8002A. In this new
subsection 3 the legislature added rulemaking pursuant to Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. The
current version of§ I 8-8002A replaces Department of Law Enforcement with ISP. Judge Brudie
determined that the use of the word "may" was intended by the legislature to simply grant ISP
discretionary authority to promulgate rules regarding breath testing. Judge Brudie stated: "The
Standards, or the SOP's (sic), are not rules, are not required to be rules, and therefore may not be
promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act." Hern Opinion Rat p. 545. At
no time did Judge Brudie ask any questions at oral argument regarding the use of the word "may".
Judge Brudie's decision also does not cite to any case that supports his position that an entire
paragraph such as LC. § I 8-8002A(3) should be void or null in its effect. The Court in Hern
disregards the mandatory language found in subsections § I 8-8002A(3)(a) & (b ).
Judge Brudie' s analysis of LC. § I 8-8002A(3) is contrary to the holding of State v. Swenson,
156 Idaho 633, 329 P.3d 1081 (Ct. App. 2014): "Idaho Code §§ 18-8004(4) and 18-8002A(3)
charge the Idaho State Police agency with promulgating rules prescribing standards for
administration of breath alcohol content tests." At p. I 083. The Courts in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho
134,306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013) and Platz v. State, 154 Idaho 960,303 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2013),
did not imply that there was discretion with regard to the issue of the rulemaking authority pursuant
to the Administrative Procedures Act.
The District Court in Hern also fails to note LC. § 18-8002A(l 0): "Rules, the Department
may adopt rules under the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 64, Idaho Code, deemed necessary to
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implement the provisions of this section." The legislature uses the word "may". The Court can go
to IDAPA Rule 39.02.72.000: Legal Authority: "In accordance with §18-8002A, Idaho Code, the
Idaho Transportation Board adopts the following rule governing administrative license suspension
(ALS)." (emphasis added). The Court can compare what ISPFS did with its "rulemaking" in ID AP A
Rule 11.03.01.000: Legal Authority: "The director of the Idaho State Police has general rulemaking
authority to prescribe rules and regulations for alcohol testing, pursuant to §67-2901, Idaho Code."
(emphasis added). This IDAP A rule does not cite to LC. § 18-8002A(3) regarding legal authority.
The legislature made a specific requirement under §18-8002A(3) for rulemaking. See LC. §6752311. ISPFS uses another code section of the Idaho Code that isn't specific to breath testing to try
to circumvent the legislature's directive. Clearly this failure to comply with the directive of the
legislature in§ l 8-8002A(3) is in violation of both constitutional and statutory provisions and is in
excess of the statutory authority oflSP. LC. §67-5279(3). 2 Using §67-2901 for rulemaking was
made upon an unlawful procedure and isn't supported by substantial evidence on the record. Failing
to comply with § I 8-8002A(3) was arbitrary, capricious, and an abusive discretion on the part of
ISPFS.

1 67-5231. INVALIDITY OF RULES NOT ADOPTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS CHAPTER -- TIME LIMITATION. (1) Rules
may be promulgated by an agency only when specifically authorized by statute. A temporary or final rule adopted and
becoming effective after July 1, 1993, is voidable unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter.
(2) A proceeding, either administrative or judicial, to contest any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the procedural
requirements of this chapter must be commenced within two (2) years from the effective date of the rule. (emphasis added)
2 67-5279. SCOPE OF REVIEW--TYPE OF RELIEF ... (3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or
by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

11

The Court can begin its analysis with the construction of I.C. § l 8-8002A(3) with cases from
the 1930s. "Ejusdem Generis must be considered in connection with the rule of construction in that
effect must be given to all of the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void,
superfluous or redundant". In the }vfatter of Winston Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d
664 (1936).
The objective of the legislature with regard to the modification of 18-8002A(3) was to
require the Department of Law Enforcement and now ISPFS, to comply with the rulemaking
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. There can be no other explanation for the
addition of§ 18-8002A(3 ). The Hern decision circumvents this point by failing to look at the entire
statute and the purpose behind the statute or the case law dealing with statutory construction. In
State v. Bunting Tractor Company, 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464 (1938); in a decision written by

Justice Ailshie, in which Justice Holden, Justice Givens and Justice Stevens, concurred, the Court
in interpreting the use of the word "may" in the first sentence of the statute stated: ". . . and
although the word "may" was used in the first sentence, the word "shall" is used throughout the
remained of the Act, and if it was not intended to be mandatory, it would render secs. 1510 and 1514
fully meaningless and ineffectual." Justice Ailshie stated: "For these reasons, I am constrained to
hold that sec. 65-1507 was intended to be mandatory and is to be read and construed in pari materia
with sec. 1508." At p. 632. In other words, the Supreme Court determined that one has to read the
whole statute, not one word, to give the statute its intended effect.
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In Bonner County v. Cunningham, 323 P.3d 1252 (Idaho App. 2014); the Court noted that
whether a statute is mandatory or discretionary is to be ascertained from a consideration of the Act,
its nature, its object and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.
The Court noted that an interpretation violates the fundamental principle of statutory construction
if such an interpretation does not give effect to all the words of the statute and renders any part of
the statute null. See also Carlson v. Mullen, 29 Idaho 795, 162 P.332 (1917). In State v. Nelson, 119
Idaho 444, 807 P.2d 1282 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court indicated that it was incumbent upon a court
to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity.
Why would the legislature add § 18-8002A(3) if the rulemak:ing authority was already
available to ISPFS pursuant to I.C.§67-2901. Clearly the legislature would have known that section
was in existence at the time it enacted LC. §18-8002A(3). In the Matter ofDruffel, 136 Idaho 853,
41 P.3d 739 (2002) the Court found that statutes are construed under the assumption that the
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal procedure at the time statute was passed. Druffel
is a good case for the Court to look at because it specifically dealt with overreaching by a state
agency.
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(3) must be interpreted in the context of the entire provision, not just
one word. Construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. Clearly, in this
case, using the word "may" to disregard the entire paragraph of § l 8-8002A(3) would lead to an
absurd result. See also State of Idaho v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,318 P.3d 955 (Ct.Apps. 2014).
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The Hern decision is too simplistic in its analysis of§ 18-8002A(3 ). It fails to take into account the
very reason behind the rulemaking authority, to require science in breath testing.
The Court can next review the very fine decision of Judge Stegner in State v. Nauert,
Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176. A copy of Judge Stegner' s decision is attached hereto
as Exhibit "D". Judge Stegner's very well thought out decision noted:
"As internal guidelines, the SOPs and manuals may be changed with impunity by the
agency head whenever he chooses and are not vetted by anyone other than the ISP.
Internal guidelines do not have the force and effect of law. Id. They can only govern
the internal management of an agency and they can not effect private rights or
procedures available to the public. Id.
Opinion at p. 10.
Judge Stegner goes on to note that the SOPs and manuals are not rules and that they cannot
supplement the Rules of Evidence. Judge Stegner states that Idaho Rule of Evidence 1101 makes
it clear that statutes and rules cannot effect the Rules of Evidence. Judge Stegner also determined
that the admissibility of evidence is within the inherent judicial power of the Courts and that the
legislature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its power. Judge Stegner wrote:
"The fact of the matter is that the ISP is now vested with the unilateral power to
prescribe the admission of breath testing evidence in Idaho Courts. As a result, the
statute violates the separation of doctrine powers."
Opinion at p. 14.
Attached as Exhibits A, B, and C to the Reply Brief are letters sent to ISPFS regarding
Freedom oflnformation Requests for information justifying the January 2013 changes to the SOP.
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There is a March 20, 2013, letter to Major Wills. R. at p. 528. There is a letter to Matthew Garnette
dated March 28, 2013 R. at p. 531. There is a letter dated April 8, 2013, to Major Wills. R. at p. 533.
A response to the April 8, 2013, letter is also as Exhibit D to the Reply Brief in which ISPFS noted:
"No record found" regarding any peer review, scientific literature, scientific testing or science
behind the changes made in section 6 changing the word "must" to "should", in the new provisions
that took effect on January 16, 2013, for the SOP. R. at p. 536.
The Court of Appeals has already determined that the SOP is not a rule, it is not a standard,
and that ID APA Rule 11.03.01.014.03 is not sufficient as compliance with LC.§ 18-8002A(3). State

v. Swenson, 156 Idaho 633,329 P.3d 1081 (Ct. App. 2014). Judge Brudie and Judge Stegner both
found that the SOPs are not rules and have no legal force in the law. However, each Judge gave a
different effect to his finding. Judge Brudie was wrong while Judge Stegner was right. The State
of Idaho has recognized that Judge Stegner was correct by the Stevenson e-mail and the language
found in the Notice of Rulemaking for new breath testing rules.

B. The Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol
Testing Issued by the ISP Lack the Force and Effect of Law.
"In practice rules and regulations have the same effect on people's daily lives as does
statutory law. Both have the ability to greatly affect an individual's personal freedom
and/or property. It makes little difference if the authority is a statute passed by the
legislature or a regulation adopted by an administrative agency. The effect is the
same."
This statement by former Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives and current U.S.
Congressman Michael Simpson underscores the pervasiveness of administrative rules in the lives
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ofldahoans and the serious nature of rulemaking. Because of this, as was stated in the 2009 edition
of The Idaho Rule Writer's Manual, the rulemaking process in Idaho "aims to involve all persons
affected by state agency administrative rules and make transparent the regulatory process through
which our statutory laws are implemented and [how] the practice and procedure requirements of our
governmental agencies are established. C.L. "Butch" Otter, Mike Gwartney, & Dennis R. Stevenson,
The Idaho Rule Writer's Manual: A Guide for Drafting and Promulgating Administrative Rules in
the State of Idaho, ( 2009)( emphasis added).
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAP A), codified at Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho
Code, governs rulemaking in Idaho. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "IAP A")
defines rulemaking as the process for the formulation, adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
Idaho Code§ 67-5201 (20). Through rulemaking an agency interprets, prescribes, and implements
statutory law. Id. It also clarifies, standardizes, or establishes the agency's procedure or practice
requirements. Id. All of this rulemaking is done under authority granted to the agency by the Idaho
Legislature through its passing of an enabling statute. As such, rules may be promulgated by an
agency only when specifically authorized by statute. LC. § 67-5231 (1 ). Collectively, this is an
agency's ability to make "law" under powers granted by the Legislature through statute. 3 All rules
promulgated within the authority conferred by statute and in accordance with the IAP A, have the full
force and effect of law and must be regarded as such. Higginson v. Westergard, l 00 Idaho 687, 690,

3 An agency also has the ability to make "law" under powers granted by the Idaho Constitution in that agency rulemaking grants no authority
not already conferred by statute or the Constitution.
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604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979). As such, just as a law would be overturned by the courts, a rule is invalid
if (1) is was not promulgated in substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the
IAPA, (2) does not meet legislative intent, or (3) exceeds or is outside the agency's substantive
rulemaking or statutory authority. I.C. § 67-5279(3), Bennett v. State, Dept. o/Transp., 147 Idaho
141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009).
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory
authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3), Cooper v.
Board ofProfessional Discipline o.fIdaho State Bd. o.fMedicine, 134 Idaho 44, 94 P .3d 561 (2000).

The administrative license suspension statute (hereinafter "ALS"), I.C. § 18-8002A, requires that
the Idaho Transportation Department suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC
test administered by a law enforcement officer. Wilkinson v. State Dept. o.fTransp, 151 Idaho 784,
264 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 2011). The ALS hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds
enumerated in LC. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Id. One of the five enumerated
grounds for vacating the suspension is "the tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other
intoxicating substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code." I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d).
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Idaho Code§ 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or
breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and in
compliance with standards set by the State Police. Mahurin v. State Dep't ofTransp., 140 Idaho 656,
658, 99 P.3d 125, 127 (Ct.App.2004). To carry out the authority conferred by that statute, the State
Police issued standard operating procedure manuals (herein after "SOPs") establishing procedures
for the maintenance and operation of breath test equipment.

See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE

11.03.01.014. However, the SOPs are invalid as rules, and therefore, the ITD action resting on the
SOPs must be set aside.
The SOPs are invalid as rules because they were not promulgated in accordance with the
rulemaking procedures of the IAP A. The Idaho legislature expressly authorized rules on "what
calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed ... " I.C. § 18-8002A(3)(b). But
the legislature also required those rules to be promulgated "pursuant to Chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code" - i.e., the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The IAP A defines a rule, in relevant part,
as an agency statement "that has been promulgated in compliance with" its requirements. LC.§ 675201 (19). In the absence of such compliance, the SOPs are not rules and therefore lack the force and
effect of law. They cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine legal rights or
liabilities. Therefore, because the standard operating procedures for breath alcohol testing are invalid
for failure to follow proper rulemaking procedures under the IAP A, any agency action, like an ALS
Decision, resting on the SOP must be set aside.
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If the ISP desires to adopt a "statement ... that ... prescribes ... law," it must comply with the
IAPA's rulemaking procedures. Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act: A Primer For The Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1994). If the agency has not
complied with these requirements, it has not promulgated a 'rule' and the statement lacks the force
and effect oflaw. Id citing § 67-5201, cmt. 16. If an agency wishes to impose legal obligations on
a class of persons, it must promulgate a rule. Id., see also Service Employees Jnt'l Union v. Idaho

Dep't ofHealth& Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 758-59, 683 P.2d404, 406-07 (1984) (agency manual that
had not been promulgated as a rule did not create legal rights or responsibilities). It is readily
apparent through the lack of a rulemaking record, lack of publication in the Bulletin, and lack of
public input that the ISP acted without first promulgating a rule when it issued the ever-changing
SOPs. This is problematic because the ISP, ALS hearing officers and Idaho courts use the SOPs as
if they are rules. See State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013) (wherein the
Court states, "We have treated those documents [Standard Operating Procedures for breath testing]
as "rules" for purposes of judicial review because the parties have done so and because they
constitute the only material by which the ISP has purported to authorize testing instruments and
methods."); Platz v. State, 154 Idaho 960,303 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2013) ("We have treated those
documents as "rules" for purposes of judicial review because they constitute the only materials by
which the ISP has acted upon the Idaho Code § 18- 8002A(3) authorization for the ISP to "prescribe
by rule." testing instruments and methods that are approved by the ISP, citing Hubbard v.
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Department ofTransportation, 152 Id. 879,276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012), and In re Schroeder, 147
Idaho 476,479 n. 3,210 P.3d 584,587 n. 3 (Ct.App.2009). To be fair, the Idaho courts do not limit
its use of SOPs as "rules" as applicable only to the detriment of defendants, because it has also used
SOPs as "rules" against the ISP when it fails to follow the mandatory procedures contained in the
SOPs. For example, in 2006 the Court of Appeals held that the ALS hearing officer must vacate a
driver's license suspension when it was determined that the ISP violated a mandatory provision
contained in its SOP. Gibbar v. State ofIdaho, DepartmentofTransportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d
1176, (Ct. App. 2006); see also Mahurin v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 140 Id.
65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004) (stating noncompliance with these procedures [as contained in the ISP issued
SOP for breath testing procedures] is a ground for vacating an administrative license suspension
under I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d)). Unfortunately, the ISP, ALS hearing officers and Idaho courts' use
of the SOPs as "rules" is in error. Under Idaho law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw an
agency action characterized as a rule must be promulgated according to statutory directives for
rulemaking. See I.C. § 67-5231 (declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance
with the requirements of the IAPA); Asarco Inc. v. State, 2003, 69 P.3d 139,138 Idaho 719 (2003)
(stating agency action was a "rule," and thus had to be promulgated in accordance with
Administrative Procedures Act to be valid.); Meadv. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d410, 414
(1989) (holding rules promulgated by agency action have the force and effect of law). I.C. §
67-5201 et seq. Therefore, in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rulemaking
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procedures, this Court must decide that the SOPs are not "rules" and thus, do not have the full force
and effect oflaw. If the SOP for breath alcohol testing does not have the full force and effect oflaw,
it cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine legal rights or liabilities and any agency
action resting on the SOP for breath alcohol testing must be set aside.

C. There Is No Evidence The Idaho State Police Engaged In Proper
Rulemaking Procedure In Compliance With IDAPA When It Issued The
Standard Operating Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing.
The ISP did not engage in the formal rulemaking procedures of the IAP A when it issued its
ever-changing SOPs.

This is in direct conflict to the purpose for having formal rulemaking

procedures. By requiring agency decision makers to comply with procedural norms of openness and
rationality, the IAP A both creates procedural guarantees and limits agency discretion. Michael S.
Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer For The Practitioner,
30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1994). Moreover, the drafters of the IAPA also sought to implement broad
policy goals such as opening up the administrative process to increased public participation and
scrutiny and regularizing agency proceedings. Id. But, when an agency is engaged in rulemaking it
is acting in a legislative capacity and the process constitutionally due does not include an
individualized hearing. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915). Because of this comparatively minimal due process requirement, the importance of statutory
procedures and safeguards increases. These statutory procedures are contained in §§ LC. 67-5220
to 67-5232. Idaho's administrative rulemaking process contains five stages: proposed, negotiated,
temporary, pending, and final. The following is a description of the rulemaking process under the
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IAP A from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality: First, proposed rulemaking is the stage
in which the agency proposes to amend or repeal an existing rule or to adopt a new rule. Prior to the
adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, the agency is required to publish a notice and the text of
the proposed rule in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. During this stage, the public is invited to
submit comments to the agency. Second, negotiated rulemaking is an optional process in which all
interested parties and the agency seek a consensus on the content of a rule. Agencies are encouraged
to proceed through this informal stage whenever feasible. This stage is initiated with the publication
of a Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. This process leads to
the proposed and/or temporary rulemaking stages. Temporary rulemaking is third. If the Governor
finds that temporary adoption of a rule (a) protects the public health, safety, or welfare; (b) complies
with deadlines in amendments to governing law or federal programs; or (c) confers a benefit, the
agency may proceed with temporary rulemaking.

A temporary rule may become effective

immediately upon adoption and expires upon conclusion of the next succeeding regular legislative
session unless extended by concurrent resolution. Once the temporary rule is adopted, the agency is
required to publish a notice and the text of the temporary rule in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin.
If the text of the temporary rule is the same as that of the proposed rule, the rulemaking can be
combined and published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin as a temporary/proposed rule. Next,
a pending rule is a rule that has been adopted by an agency under the regular rulemaking process and
remains subject to legislative review before becoming final and effective. Once the pending rule is
adopted, the agency is required to publish a notice of pending rule in the Idaho Administrative
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Bulletin. If the rule varies in content from that which was initially proposed, the pending rule also
must be printed in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. A pending rule must be submitted to the
legislature for review before it can become final and effective. Finally, and unless specified
otherwise, a pending rule that has been submitted for review and approved by the legislature will
become final and effective upon conclusion of that legislative session. Final rules are annually
codified in the Idaho Administrative Code.
As applied to the standard operating procedures, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest
that the ISP was in compliance with any of the steps above to even remotely show that it followed
the IAP A to properly promulgate the SOPs as "rules." In fact, quite the opposite is true.
Not only has the ISP not followed the proper rulemaking procedure of the IAP A when issuing
SOPs, it actually takes a very laid-back and painfully informal approach to creating SOPs. Because
ISP did not engage in the formal rulemaking procedures under the IAPA, the SOPs are merely
guidelines and do not have the full force and effect of law to the extent an agency decision can rest
upon them.
To be clear, and by its own reference, the issuing authority of the breath alcohol testing SOP
is the "ISPFS Quality Manager," recognized to stand for Idaho State Police Forensic Science Quality
Manager. See Idaho State Police Forensic Services, 6.0 Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating
Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, 08/2013. But, the ISPFS is part of the Idaho State
Police, insomuch as its actions amount to actions by the ISP. The Forensic Section did not begin as
part of the State Police department, but officially became pai1 of the Idaho State Police in 1999 when
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the Bureau of Forensic Services became ISP Forensic Services. 4 So while the ISPFS is the" issuing
authority" of the breath testing SOP, because it is part of the ISP, it too must follow the proper
rulemaking procedure of the IAPA when issuing SOPs.
"6.0 Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, Effective
8/20/2013" is the most current version of the Idaho State Police's SOP for breath alcohol testing.
This is the second "new edition" in the year 2013, with Revision 4 taking effect a mere 7 months
prior to the latest edition. 5 Additionally, while the year 2012 saw only one revision 6 , Revision 3, the
year 2010 saw three different editions of this SOP. 7 If the discussion stopped right there, it is
patently obvious that these SOPs are readily changed and revised with relative ease and in a fast, and
likely cost-effective, manner. This is in contrast to the typical tirneline for rulemaking when
following the proper rulemaking procedures under the IAP A. That tirneline consists of months, but
is understandable how formal rulemaking would take longer, because it are these formal procedural
safeguards that prevent the arbitrary and on a whim changes that are seen in the current way the
SOPs are created. Nevertheless, this discussion continues.

4 SIT IDAHO STATE POLICE, History of ISP Forensics, available at http://www.isp. idaho.goviforcnsicsiindex.html "The lc1rcnsics unit had ils
bq,inning., in I()61 11hcn the Di, is ion or l .ah()ratorics in the rkpartmc:nl or Health csrahlishcJ an anal; ti cal unit lt1r the analysis or blood and
breath ,ilcoh1,i for the Idaho State Police. ·1 he Forensic Section was transferred to the Dcpmtmrnt of Law Enforcement from rhc Bure,1u llf
Laboratories in the Dq1artmcm of I kalth and Wdl"arc Jul\ I, 1988. The name of the Department changnl to Idaho State l\iiicc Jul\ 1. I999 and
Bureau ol fon.Thic Scrvics:s became [SP Forensic S-:n·iccs. ,,
SE!:' IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSIC SERVICES, 6.0 Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision
5,08/2013, page 5.

gw

6 ID.

? ID
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Even though the ISP approach to issuing the SOPs is painfully informal, we recognize it
would be helpful to the Court to have an outline of what procedure the ISP does follow when it
wishes to change, revise or implement an SOP. Unfortunately, the ISP's approach is so painfully
informal, that there doesn't appear to be much in the way of a record from which an outline can be
created. What we do know is that the SOPs are frequently revised. Further the 2009 SOP was nine
pages long and the first SOP of 2010 was 17 pages long - see Exhibit "E" attached hereto. But, we
have no information about who determined what changes would be made and/or why. Additionally,
and over the years, there appears to be significant changes with regard to the word "must." Many
instances of the word "must" in earlier editions of the SOP was evidently changed to "should." For
example. In the 2009 SOP, section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the
subject/individual must be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minute." (emphasis added) Compare
this to the SOP dated November 1, 2010, wherein section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath
alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes."
(emphasis added) From the documents obtained under the Freedom oflnformation Act, it appears
that concerns, revisions, and most discussions regarding the SOPs occur over e-mail.
Jeremy Johnston in an email to prosecutors and others, which is dated December 19, 2012,
stated:

"I have made some changes to the SOP due to rulings, suggestions and need for

clarifications. Please review this and see if there needs to more or less added." Augmented record,
Rat p. 201. The court can review the emails generated just prior to the introduction of the SOP on
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January 16, 2013. Augmented record, Rat pp. 176-228. These emails represent the reasons for the
change of the SOP from the one dated April 23, 2012. No science is noted to justify the changes.
No science is noted to justify the changes from "must" to "should" in the SOP. There is no
indication in the emails that the machines have changed and there is no explanation as to why 30
years of mandatory language has been replaced with discretionary language.
On May 11, 2012, just a few days after the SOP was modified in April, Jeremy Johnston
sends the following email to one "kmumford@kcgovus": "What was the wording you wanted for
the SOP change that we had talked about a few weeks back? I'm having a conference call next week
about the changes and wanted to get the wording right in there so it works for all sides". Augmented
R. at p. 199.

What science justifies the changes to the SOP so often?

See SOP History Page,

Augmented Record, R. at p. 182. There is no science.
Please note that the Idaho Supreme Court has determined an agency action is capricious if
it was done without a rational basis. In American Law Association of Idaho/Nevada v. State, 142
Id. 544, 130 P.3d 1082 (2006), the Court found it was arbitrary if the agency action was done in
disregard ofthe facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles. What
was the rational basis for making the SOP a discretionary document? There was a disregard of
scientific principles, facts and circumstances making the current SOP arbitrary.
The e-mails noted in this case make it clear that ISPFS failed to comply with the mandate of
LC. § 18-8004(4) and LC.section l 8-8002A.
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There is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees of the ISPFS. Mr. Jewkes
states:

"I am not sure if I dare ask, but are there any other parts of the SOP that you
feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may" or
"approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here is your
chance:)." (emphasis added)
Augmented Record, R. at p. 82

It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the":)" symbol.
The legislature passed I.C. § I 8-8004(4) requiring valid methods of breath testing. ISPFS
has made rules that weaken the breath testing standards so much that basically if the police get a
result, it is admissible. Therefore, ISPFS has taken this delegation of authority to an unconstitutional
level.
This should be a discussion of improvements to the scientific methods, not improvements
to the methods to withstand legal challenges. In support of this, the Court can note that there is very
little science discussed in the e-mails with regards to changes to the SOPs. This is concerning
because the procedures used to test and the operation of the breath test machines are very scientific
in nature and require adherence that facilitates proper use so as to provide a reliable result. Even the
Court of Appeals recognized the importance of a reliable result in that "the purpose of [J.C.] I 88002, is to provide an incentive for motorists to cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol
content by a reasonably precise scientific method." (emphasis added). State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497,
725 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the reason the legislature has allowed the expedited
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

27

introduction of breath test results in DUis and ALS matters is because of the guarantee of science.
See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988), State v. Phillips, 117 Idaho 609, 790
P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).
Wherein the Court of Appeal's in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App.
2013), stated in a footnote, "We have not however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually
constitute 'rules' or that ISP has 'prescribed by rule' testing instruments and methods as
contemplated by Idaho Code 18-8002A(3); that issue has never been presented to this court," this
Court is. As Mr. Bramble-Smollett cried in Humphry Clinker, "there is no time like the present."
With this question now presented to this Court, it's time for a determination of the status of the
SOPs. By its own account, the ISPFS indicates that the coming years "will see ISP Forensic Services
continue to contribute fair and impartial scientific analysis to the criminal justice system. [And]
Incorporation ofimproved analytical methods and continuing quality assurance programs will assure
the perpetuation of high standards currently maintained by the unit. 8" It is clear, through its painfully
informal process of creating and modifying the standard operating procedures that the ISP needs
guidance from this court to help facilitate it's goals of "contributing fair and impartial scientific
analysis" and "incorporating improved analytical methods and continuing quality assurance
programs" so that it may effectively perpetuate the high standards it currently maintains.

8 SEE IDAHO STATE POLICE, History of ISP Forensics, available at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html.
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Ultimately, the SOP for breath testing procedure cannot be characterized as "rules" because
they were not promulgated in compliance with the formal rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, and
as such, do not have the full force and effect of law. However, if this Court decides the SOPs are
in fact "rules," as they are so treated by Idaho courts, ALS hearing officers and the ISP, this Court
must contemporaneously find that the SOPs for breath alcohol testing are invalid for failing to
substantially comply with the with the procedural requirements of the IAP A. And again, an invalid
"rule" does not have the full force and effect oflaw. It is clear, then, that regardless of whether or
not this Court determines the SOP to be a "rule" or not, the SOP for breath alcohol testing does not
have the full force and effect oflaw and it cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine
legal rights or liabilities. Therefore, any agency action resting on the SOP for breath alcohol testing
must be set aside.

II.
THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS IN ALS HEARINGS
Mr. Hem was arrested for DUI on April 5, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2, Rat p. I. Mr. Hern was
served with the Administrative License on April 6, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2, R. at p. I. Mr. Hem's
temporary license expired on May 5, 2013. Mr. Hem's hearing was schedule for May 9, 2013. Mr.
Hern was without driving privileges prior to the hearing. Counsel for Mr. Hem asked for a stay on
May 9, 2013. The hearing officer initially ordered a stay on May 10, 2013, and back-dated the Stay
Order four (4) days to May 6, 2013. Said back dating didn't do Mr. Hem much good because the
stay wasn't in effect and his license was suspended as of May 5, 2013. The order did not transport
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Mr. Hem back in time. The initial Stay Order (Clerk's Exhibit 2, Rat p. 61) notes that Mr. Hern did
not get the benefit of the fact that his license had been suspended. Mr. Hem's attorney sent a letter
to the hearing officer on May 10, 2013, stating that the hearing officer's May 10, 2013 Order did not
note that Mr. Hem's license had been suspended already. The hearing office issued another Stay
Order lessening the license suspension from 90 days to 85 days. Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 62. Mr. Hern
was without his license for a period time before a hearing had been held and before a decision was
reached. A decision wasn't reached until May 24, 2013. Record at pp. 9-30.
The District Court fails to acknowledge that Mr. Hern, ifhe had won his ALS hearing, would
have been irreparably harmed because his license had been suspended without hearing and the
hearing was delayed without just cause. The show cause letter was inappropriate as it could not be
contested and was not based on any foundation for good cause. Another driver and client of
Counsel's, Geoffrey Cseh Jr., ITD File No. 648000143728, won his ALS hearing but this was days
after his license was suspended. His hearing was held after his temporary license ended because he
requested subpoenas, also like Mr. Hern. He had no due process in his hearing. He was harmed
without an ability to repair said harm. The argument regarding no due process is not hypothetical
as Judge Brudie believed. The lack of a license was a reality to Mr. Cseh.
The Court of Appeals strongly discouraged the practice that it found rampant in these ALS
cases about hearings being scheduled improperly and subpoenas being issued in such a fashion that
the driver was at a disadvantage.
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Look at what was subpoenaed in the Hern case: the arresting officer, the log sheet, and the
video. How exactly is a driver supposed to meet his burden of proof without this basic relevant
evidence?

Clearly the legislature contemplated,

by the very definition found in LC. § 18-

8002A(l )(f), that subpoenas and relevant evidence would be forthcoming within the twenty (20) day
standard set in LC. § 18-8002A(7).
Mr. Hern was served the Notice of Suspension on April 6, 2013. He made a request to the
Department for a hearing and subpoenas on April 9, 2013. The hearing officer didn't bother to issue
the subpoenas until April 15, 2013. The hearing officer generated a straw man of"good cause" when
he didn't issue the subpoenas until six (6) days after the notice was received. There is no explanation
for this delay.

It should also be recognized that the hearing officers have no standards for issuing stays.
There is no standard or rule regarding good cause. The hearing officers just willy-nilly decide what
cases they are going to stay and what cases they don't. See George J. Besaw, Jr. v. State of Idaho,

Department of Transportation, Docket No. 39759-2012
The hearing officer's decision, however, is convoluted with regard to his ability to decide
the due process issue. On the one hand, the hearing officer argues that the issue of due process is
not a part of J.C. § 18-8002A(7) and, thus, he comes to the conclusion that a hearing officer can only
vacate a licensed suspension based on the five statutory grounds. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at 13 7. Yet
the hearing officer indicates there is no basis for finding a due process violation. Clerk's Exhibit 2
at p. 136. The one thing we do know is that Mr. Hern had a Notice of Suspension that said it was
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served on April 6, 2013. Actually there is no knowing when Mr. Hem was actually served because
the arresting officer did not personally serve Mr. Hem. Clerk Exhibit 1, Tr. at p. 11. We do know
a hearing was requested on April 9, 2013, and LC.§ 18-8002A(7) states, in pertinent, part as follows:
"If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held within twenty (20) days of the
date the hearing request was received by the Department unless this period is, for
good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten day period."

Based on a hearing request being made on April 9, 2013, a hearing should have been held
on or before April 29, 2013. Instead, the hearing officer noted that a hearing would be held on May
9, 2013.
The hearing officer indicates that the Department routinely allows three days for service of
the subpoena and ten days for production of the requested evidence. Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 135. If
that is the case, then the subpoenas would have been served by April 18, 2013, and the evidence
produced by April 28, 2013. If the subpoenas were issued on April 9, 2013 then they would have
been served by April 12, 2013, and the evidence produced by April 22, 2013 and the hearing could
have been held on April 24, 25, 26, 29 or 30 or on May 1,2, or 3, 2013. All these dates are before
the 30 day temporary license expires.
The information from the arresting officer was sent to the Department on April 10, 2013.
Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 1 (note the date stamp at the bottom right hand comer of some parts of the
record) The Department indicates that it forwarded the audio/video recording April 14, 2013, the
performance verification records on April 18, 2013, and the reports on April 19, 2103. Clerk's
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Exhibit 2 at p. 135. However, the record actually shows that the breath testing machine logs were
sent out on April 17, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 75.
Case law allows a driver's license to be suspended prior to a due process hearing. The
reasons were set out in a series of United States Supreme Court cases. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
"This court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be
done if it can be undone. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bayview, 395
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, (1969). Surely, in this case before us, if
there is a delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner suffers from the
deprivation of his children, and the children suffer from the uncertainty and
dis! ocated."
At p. 647.
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971 ), the Court stated once
licenses are issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses .. .involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. At p. 539.
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191,
14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). See also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394, 34 S.Ct. 79, 783, 58 L.Ed.
1363 (1914) and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-344, 96 S.Ct. at 907.
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As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52
L.Ed.2d 172, (1977) the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one. The State will not be able
to make a driver whole for any personal inconveniences and economic hardships suffered by reason
of any delay in redressing an erroneous post suspension review procedure. 4 31 U.S. at 131, 91 S. Ct.
at 1728.
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the Court deemed it fundamental that except in emergencies
situations, the state must afford a hearing before a driver's license termination become effective. It
is interesting to note that the U.S. Supreme Court, with regard to these sorts of issues, focuses on
credibility and veracity. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-344, 96 S.Ct. at 907. The
suspension itself effects the final deprivation of property that no subsequence proceeding can restore.
See again Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 340, 96 S.Ct. at 905. The court in Bell v. Burson,
supra, made it quite clear that additional expense occasioned by expanding the hearing process is
sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. While the problem of additional expense must
be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process.
At pp. 541-542.
In Bell v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P .3d. 1030 (2011 ), the
Court found the actions of the hearing officer troubling because there seemed to be a disregard for

Bell's substantial interest in receiving a decision before, or at least, promptly after the deprivation
of his license. Bell at p. 671.
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The Bell Court in a footnote stated:

"If delays of this magnitude occurred in a case where the driver ultimately prevailed,
the driver would have suffered a remediable and unacceptable lost of driving
privileges for over three quarters of the minimum suspension term described by Idaho
Code § l 8-8002A( 4)(a) before issuance of a decision overturning the suspension."
At p. 671.
The Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)
determined whether an administrative proceeding satisfies due process. The first factor deals with
the private interest that would be effected by the official action. The second involves the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The final factor involves the government's interest
including the function involved in the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedure would entail. See Bell, supra.
The Court In The Matter of Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 167; 911 P.2d 754 (1996), simply stated:
"Procedural due process requires that a party be provided at an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner". See also Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163
(1989) and Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922),
In a footnote, the Platz court cites its concern regarding pre-decision suspensions in Bell by
stating:
"Although Bell's repeated request for irrelevant discovery contributed somewhat to
the hearing's postponement, the delays involved here are troubling to this court. The
actions of the hearing officer evidences little regard for Bell's substantial interests in
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receiving the decision before, or at least promptly after, the deprivation of this
license. Bell v. !TD, 151 Id. 659,671,262 P.3d 1030, 1040 (Ct. App. 2011)."
At p. 661.
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that Georgia had several alternative
methods of compliance. One involved Georgia electing to abandon its present scheme completely
and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other states. At p. 543. Georgia could also
reject all of the above suggestion and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The fact is that ITD
continues to delete sections of the ID APA rules that benefit the driver such as the ID APA, Rule
39.02.72.600. This rule required hearing officers to have decisions done within 30 days. The Court
can address these issues on review and send a message like the U.S. Supreme Court did in Bell v.

Burson that the state should just take the several alternative methods of compliance available to it
and bring the ALS system in compliance with due process.
The Bell court stated:
"However, an undue delay in holding a post-suspension hearing or issuing a decision
may constitute a deprivation of due process. Federal Deposit Ins. v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230,242 (1988); Jones v. City ofGary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435, 1444 (7 th Cir. 1995);
Padberg v. lvfcGarth-A1cKechnie, 203 F. Supp. 2d 261,278 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), affd
60 F.App'x 861 (2d Cir. 2003)."
At p. 670.
Please recall that ALS hearing officers can not make constitutional decisions based on the
administrative statutes that apply to these administrative hearings. IDAPA Rule, 4.11.01.415. The
Court in Bell v. !TD, supra, failed to note this in its decision about the failure of the driver to raise
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this constitutional issue with the ITD hearing officer. See Bell at p. 671
Mr. Hern has a interest in his driver's license that is quite substantial. The record in this case
shows that there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of his driver's license through the current
procedures used. Clearly, it would be easy enough to modify the procedure to note that the
temporary license does not terminate until the hearing officer's decision is reached. The State of
Washington uses this procedure. RCW §§ 46.25.125(6) and 46.20.308(8). The government's
interest in changing this procedure is minimal and there is no administrative burden. In fact,
extending the time frame for decisions and suspensions probably would be welcomed by the ALS
hearing officers because they would have more time to issue decisions and not be overburdened with
the few days they have from when the hearing is held until when the temporary license expires.
There is no due process in this ALS process. The factors found in A1atthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) are found in this case.
III.
THE ACTIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER
VIOLATED MR. HERN'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.
The decision by Judge Brudie in Hern regarding equal protection simply misses the point.
Mr. Hem's equal protection rights were violated because he was treated differently because he
requested subpoenas not because the requested Subpoenas were denied. Mr. Hern did not get the
benefit of a timely hearing within twenty (20) days of a request for hearing specifically because he
requested subpoenas. His argument has nothing to do with subpoenas being requested and denied
or how any specific subpoena may have led to information relevant to a defense of his license
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suspension. The District Judge in Mr. Hem's case basically ignored the argument that was put
before him.
The simple facts of this case show that Mr. Hern, and all other drivers requesting the most
basic information, are being treated differently than those drivers that don't ask for subpoenas. Or
maybe there is a different standard if you just ask for the arresting officer to be subpoenaed. Or
maybe there is a different standard if the driver requests just the log sheet. Who knows? There are
no ITD rules that the Court can review. This practice of shooting from the hip in issuing show cause
letters without hearings or any justification for a hearing delay does not allow for due process or
equal protection and cannot be explained away by the Invited Error Doctrine, which is what State
argued below.
The hearing officer has a duty to issue subpoenas and gather relevant evidence. LC. § l 88002A(l )( f). The hearing officer has a duty to have a hearing within 20 days of the receipt of the
request for hearing from the driver. The hearing officer in Mr. Hern' s case choose to set the hearing
after the 20 days mandated by the legislature because Mr. Hern asked that subpoenas be issued for
relevant evidence. The hearing officer specifically noted this as the cause for the extension to May
9, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at pp 94 and 135. Under the rational basis test a classification will
withstand an equal protection challenge if there is any conceivable state of facts that will support it.

Afeisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Id. 258,954 P2d 676, (1998). The equal protection clauses ofthe
Idaho and federal constitutions embrace principles that all persons in like circumstances should
receive the same benefit and burdens of the law. Here Mr. Hern was treated differently because he
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requested subpoenas. He was punished for taking the small advantage allowed him from the ALS
statute regarding limited discovery. There is nothing in this record that supports Mr. Hem being
treated differently than a driver who does not request limited discovery. Remember, Mr. Hem has
the burden of proof in this ALS matter. This burden is difficult to meet without some of the
"relevant evidence" the statute allows. Due process requires a liberty interest while equal protection
does not. State v. Reed, 107 Id. 162, 686 P2d 842 ( Ct. App. 1984).
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution is designed to
assure that those persons similarly situated with respect to governmental action are treated alike.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 439 (1985). The same protection is
afforded under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Missamore, 119 Id. 27,33; 803 P2d 528, 534 (1990).
Selective or discriminatory enforcement or application of a statute may amount to an equal
protection violation under the state and federal constitutions if the challenger shows a deliberate plan
of discrimination based on some unjustifiable classification. A "class of one" may state an equal
protection claim ifhe or she was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and
the difference in treatment fails to satisfy the requisite level of scrutiny. Village of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 US 562,564, (2000)(per curiam): Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Id 509,514, 50 P3d 1004,
1009 (2002). Mr. Hem may be a class of one or there may be many more. Counsel for Mr. Hern has
had other clients treated in the same manner, one client won his ALS hearing, but he still had to
suffer the loss of his license because the hearing was not held in a timely manner.
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In the alternative, if there is no equal protection violation, the hearing officer has made this
decision to treat Mr. Hem differently in violation of l.C. § 67-5279(3). Either way, the decision to
set the hearing outside the mandatory 20 day period violated Mr. Hem's rights and was not justified
on this record. Mr. Hern did not invite error by asking for subpoenas allowed by LC. § 18-8002A.
The court must set aside the hearing officer's decision and remand to the Department with
an order to set aside the license suspension.
VII.
CONCLUSION

ISPFS has failed to follow the statutory mandate of LC.§ 18-8002A regarding "rule" making
and thus the breath testing system in Idaho fails. l.C. § 67-5279 mandates a reversal because this
action of the agency was unconstitutional, was beyond statutory authority and was arbitrary . In
addition, the failure to have the ALS hearing within the 20 day time frame mandated by the
legislature violated Mr. Hem's due process rights, no hearing in a meaningful time or in a
meaningful manner. An equal protection violation has also occurred. If one reads enough of the
ALS hearing officers' decisions one will see that they treat the driver as the enemy. Almost any
thing will be done to prevent a driver from winning at an ALS hearing. The hearing officer's failure
to issue subpoenas in a timely fashion contributed to the delay. There was no good cause in this case
as the "cause" was simply generated by the hearing officer's failure to act.
Since the hearing officer made no sort of record regarding good cause and didn't have a
hearing, the Court can also find that the decision to expand the hearing past the twenty (20) days and
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thirty (30) days limit is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
The Court must find that the license suspension was improper and enter an order directing
ITD to vacate the license suspension for Mr. Hem and send the matter back to the Department with
instructions to set aside the suspension.
DATED this

day of December, 2014.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

By______________
Charles M. Stroschein, a member of the firm
Attorneys for Appellant
I hereby certify on the
day of December, 2014, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
was:
Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered to:
Edwin L. Litteneker
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 321
Lewiston, ID 83501
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

By--=-==-==--=--=--=--=--=~--=--=Attorneys for Appellant
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EXHIBIT A

IDAPA 11-IDAHO STATE POLICE
11.03.01 - RULES GOVERNING ALCOHOL TESTING
DOCKET NO. XX-XXXX-XXXX (OAR will assign)
NOTICE OF RULEMAKING - TEMPORARY AND PROPOSED RULE

EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of the temporary rule is September 2, 2014.
AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221 (I) and 67-5226, Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this
agency has adopted a temporary rule, and proposed rulemaking procedures have been initiated. The action is
authorized pursuant to Section 67-2901, Idaho Code.
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE: Public hearing(s) concerning this rulemaking will be scheduled if requested in
writing by twenty-five (25) persons, a political subdivision, or an agency, not later than October 14, 2014.
The hearing site(s) will be accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for accommodation must be made not
later than five (5) days prior to the hearing, to the agency address below.

DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The following is the required finding and concise statement of its supporting
reasons for adopting a temporary rule and a nontechnical explanation of the substance and purpose of the proposed
rulemaking:
This rule adds current standard operating procedures published by Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) for
alcohol analysis and breath testing to administrative rule. These rules have previously been part of the standard
operating procedure documents published by ISPFS for use in court testimony.
The following procedures will be added to administrative rule:
• Breath alcohol instrument training requirements for operators and specialists;
• Breath alcohol instrument performance verification and calibration requirements and rules;
• Breath alcohol testing requirements and procedures;
• Alcohol laboratory approval and operational standards;
• Minor in possession/minor in consumption (MIP/MIC) testing methods; and
• Passive testing procedures.

TEMPORARY RULE JUSTIFICATION: Pursuant to Section(s) 67-5226(l){a), Idaho Code, the Governor has
found that temporary adoption of the rule is appropriate for the following reasons:
The need for the temporary rule change is due to ongoing criminal cases and appeals in the Idaho judicial system to
suppress blood alcohol results based on the current process of having the rules governing breath alcohol testing in
ISP Forensic Services' Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) rather than administrative rule. If the breath alcohol
results are suppressed by the courts because of the current wording, DUI cases with breath test results would not be
able to be prosecuted in Idaho. Not prosecuting DUI cases presents a significant public safety threat.

FEE SUMMARY: The following is a specific description of the fee or charge imposed or increased: NIA
FISCAL IMPACT: The following is a specific description, if applicable, of any negative fiscal impact on the state
general fund greater than ten thousand dollars($ l0,000) during the fiscal year: N/A
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: Pursuant to Section 67-5220(2), Idaho Code, negotiated rulemaking was not
conducted because there is no change to the process for alcohol testing, the change is merely adding the current
standard operation procedure to administrative rule.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE: Pursuant to Section 67-5229(2)(a), Idaho Code, the following is a brief
synopsis of why the materials cited are being incorporated by reference into this rule:
There is one incorporation by reference that continues in this rule. It did not need to be updated in this revision. The
reference is a federal registry document listing the breath testing instruments in compliance/conformance with
Department of Transportation regulations. The instruments approved in Idaho must be on the conforming products
list.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For assistance
on technical questions concerning the temporary and proposed rule, contact Matthew Garnette, Director of Forensic
Services at (208) 884-7217.
Anyone may submit written comments regarding the proposed rulemaking. All written comments must be directed
to the undersigned and must be delivered on or before October 21, 2014.
DATED this 28 th day of August, 2014.
Colonel Ralph W. Powell, Director
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Dr., Meridian, ID 83642
(208) 884-7003/(208) 884- 7090

EXHIBITB

Garnette, Matthew
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Dennis Stevenson [Dennis.Stevenson@adrn.idaho.gov]
Wednesday, July 09, 2014 11 :53 AM
Garnette, Matthew
RE: Nauert ruling

UnfortL:nateiy, t think Judge Stegner got it (ght. The SOP manual is not an :nternal n1anagerrent Cocurnen~ per se. A,s
the judge pointed out, the SOP does affect the ru:es of evidence \Nhich !n tur·n, affect the rights of the pub:ic.
1

Because the SOP is not incorporated by referer:ce., it does not have the ~Drce and effect of lavv. One cf the
a ruie is the practice or procedure requirements of an ngency., and, in this casef these procedures affect the private
rights of the pub!ic or the ;;rocedures available t.'J the public and, as such~ mu:;;t be put into ru'.2 to be enforc;~ab!e.

of

That's my 2 cents ,North.
Best Re~;a,ds,
Dennis Stevenson
State Administrative Rules Coordinator
Dept of Administration
State of Idaho
208.332.1822
208-332-1892 fax

Ccn.fdenrfalfty Staternent: This ele~troric mesSO[Je corta/r,s infornn;tion frorn ihe Office of rhe Adtniristrctive Rules Cooro':notorf Department of
Adtr:inistrotion1 and is confidential Ot privileged. The ir.f·ornlatlon is intended soiely for the use oj rhe indfvidua:(:sj or enti~y(ies} norned abov-£. tf you
hcve recei•1ed this e-rn(Jf/ ir. er.re.Jr, p:'ease norij:l ~15 inrmeJ:cte!y by c2i,:,r:::hone at. 208~332· 1820, i:;;r f:·y e-:r;oi! rep.!/~ and delete the messa~1e. Th:;r;k
you.

From: Garnette, Matthew [rnailto:matthew.garnette@isp.idaho.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2014 10:12 PM
To: Dennis Stevenson

Subject: Nauert ruling

have?

are \<:.rv critica! that
; the breath

them. There are policy and procedure type things in those documents. I have also included a link to our website so you
can look at the SOPs we have in this discipline. I am most interested in your thoughts on agency rules versus agency
policies & pr·ocedures (as we discussed at our meeting). It is a tric!<y discipline because we basically set the rules for how
alcohol testing is to be done in Idaho. I would love to have a discussion with you---afte1· you (or someone there) has the
opportunity to review these documents.
httr,i://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/documents/currentAMs/Breath%20Alcohol/6.0%20ldaho%20Breath%20Alcohol%2
0Standard%20Operating%20Procedure%20rev%205.pdf

Matthew Garnette, IV1.S., C.P.M.
1
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)

Fifty-fourth Legislature

First Regular Session - 1997

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE BILL NO. 284
BY TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE

22

AN ACT
RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO
CODE, TO ADD DEFINITIONS, TO REQUIRE PEACE OFFICERS TO INFORM DRIVERS AT
THE TIME OF EVIDENTIARY TESTING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT
TO· OR FAILING AN EVIDENTIARY TEST, TO PROVIDE RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, TO INCREASE THE TIME IN WHICH A PEACE OFFICER MUST FORWARD A NOTICE OF SUSPENSION, TO ADD CODE REFERENCES, TO AUTHORIZE PEACE OFFICERS TO SUBMIT A DUPLICATE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL TEST
RESULTS WITH THEIR STATEMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER
WHICH TEMPORARY DRIVING PRIVILEGES WILL BE ISSUED; AMENDING SECTION
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE, TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO CODE,
UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1998 AND TO CORRECT A CODE REFERENCE; REPEALING SECTION
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE; AMENDING SECTION 49-326, IDAHO CODE, TO REDUCE FROM
TWENTY-ONE DAYS TO TWENTY DAY.S, THE TIME THAT HEARINGS MUST BE HELD AFTER
RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO EXTEND THE HEARING
DATE BY TEN DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO
ADMINISTER OATHS AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AMENDING SECTION
49-328, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO COLLECT ONLY ONE FEE PER
REINSTATEMENT; AMENDING SECTION 49-330, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW DRIVERS WHOSE
DRIVER'S
LICENSES HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, SUSPENDED, DISQUALIFIED, OR
RESTRICTED TO FILE A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

23

Be It Enacted By The Legislature Of The State Of Idaho:

24
25

SECTION 1. That Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s
amended to read as follows:

26
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18-8002A. TESTS OF DRIVER FOR ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION, PRESENCE OF DRUGS OR
OTHER INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES -- SUSPENSION UPON FAILURE OF TESTS. (1) Defini-
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hereby

tions. As used in this section:
(a) "Actual physical control" means being in the driver's position of a
motot vehicle with the motor running -0r with the vehi~le moving.
(b) 11 Administrative hearing" means a hearing conducted by a hearing offito determine whether a suspension imposed by the provisions of this
section should be vacated or sustained.
(be) 11 Department 11 means the Idaho transportation department and, as the
co;text requires, shall be construed to include any agent of the department designated by rule as hereinafter provided.
(e.9) 11 Director" means the director of the Idaho transportation department.
(e) "Evidentiary testing" means a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the
presence of drugs or otlier intoxicating substances in a person, including
additional testing authorized by subsection (6) of this section. An evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based on a formula of
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF l{OOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plamtiff/Respondcnt,
vs.

MARTIN EUGENB NAUERT,
Defendi:u1t/Appellant.
---- · · - - - - - -

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CnBo No. CV-2013-1017H

MEMORANDUM OPINION

______)

In this case; the defendant, Martin-Eugene Nauert, entered a conditional
guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of Aleohol, a misdemeanor, in violation of
LC. § 18-8001. Naucrt now appeals to this Cout't, challenging the Magistrate
Jud~e's denials of his Motion to Suppress and his Motion in Limine. The case was
submitted on the brief of Nauert without oral argument as authorized by I./\..R.
37(e). For reasons that have never been explained, tho State did not respond t.o
Naul:lrt's brief.
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BACKGROUND
The State and Naue1·t stipulated to a brief Btatement of facts: Nauer1,
consented to an evidentiary breath test for the p1·escnce of alcohol in hh-., body after
being provided with an administtative license s1.u:,pension (ALS) warning. Naucrt
challenged the com;titutional validity of his consent via a Motion to Suppre1:,1,, He
also filed a Motion in Limine challenging the validity of the standard operating
procedures (SOPs) and manuals created by t;he Idaho State Police (ISP) to govern

evidentiary testing for alcohol ai1d the foundations for the admissibility of those test
results.
The 'Magistrate Judge denied Nauert's motions. As a re~ult of his challenge8

being 1·ejectcd, Nauert e11t;ered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the
Magistrate fJudgc's decisions to this Court.

LAW
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on a bifurcated
Btandanl. State v. Wheeler, 14B Idaho 364, 233 P.3d 1286 (Ct. ApJL 2010). FindingH
of fact supported by 1mbstantial evidence ar.e accepted, but the reviewing court
considers the application of constitutional principles de novo. Id., 149 Idaho at 370~
238 P.3d at 1292.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that citizens shall

be secm:e from unreai:,onahle searches and seizures, and that no wartants shall be
issued except upon a showing of probable cause. U.S, CONST. AMEND. IV. Article[,
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§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides similar, although some would argue greater,
p1·otcction against unl'easonable searches.
Consent is a well-l·ecognized exception to the Fourth Amendme11t
requiremont for a search warrant. Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 370, 233 P.8d nt 1292.
Under Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1), every oporator of a motor vehicle in the t::itate of
Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol
concentration. 1 This is commonly 1·eforred to ai:, implied consent. Among other
provisions, the implied consent statute authorizes the imposition of a $250 penalty

and t,he suspension of one's ch·iving privileges for• one year for refu1ml to submit to
· testing. I.C. § 18-8002. Both the financial penalty and the loss of driving p1·ivileg-es

a1·e characterized as civil penalties. A driver may also be shown to freely and
voluntarily consent to an cvidentiary test, f'mch as a breath test, in light of all the
circumstances. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 818; 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001).

1 LC. § 18-8002(1) st.ateR:
Any person who drives or is in physic.al conh'ol of a motor vehicle in this state shall
be deemed Lo have givon hi!:l <..,·nnsent to evidontia:ry tesLing for concentration of
alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his cons<mt. to
cvidentfa.ry testing for t.he presence of drugs or other intoxicating suhstances,
provided that su(:h testing is administered a~ the request of a peace officer having
roasonable grounds to believe that person has heen drivin~ or in actual physical
cont1•ol of a motor vehicle in violation of the provision11 of section_ VHW.04, T_daho
Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.
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ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge Did Not Err in Denying Nauert's Motion to
Suppress, Because Nauert's Consent to Breath Testing Was Not Coerced
Nauert argues that his consent was unconstitutional becam:,e he waR coerced
into agreeing to have his breath tested for alcohol. He contends he was forced to
agree to the testing because of the onerous penalties he faced if he we1·e to 1·cfuse
testing. The ALS advisory informs the dtiver, among other things: "You arc
required by law to take one or more evidentia1·y test(s) to determine the
concentration of alcohol or p1·esenco of drugs or other intoxicating substances in
your body." Following this admonition ii, a list of ciuil penalties that may be
imposed against a driver for his refusal to undetgo testing. (As noted, these include
a fine of up to $250 and loss of one's drivi.rig privilegeH fo1• one year. The ALS
advisory does not advise the drive1· that the test result8, if (;hey i:;how an alcohol
concentration of .08 or above, may be introduced in a criminal tdal and that such a
showing would result in the driver being found to have been operating the vehicle
while undet the influence of alcohol. J.C. § 18-8004(1)(a).)
Nauert m·gnei:; that Missouri u. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) requires a
different analyi:;is of what warni11g is mquircd regarding hifi ctiminal case. Nm1e1·t
seems to argue that because the implied consent advisory does not advise the driver
of the critninal implications of taking the test and failing it, that it cannot be
considered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver for criminal putpm,es.
In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that:
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4

I IVtll. U!!l'\.IIVVV!I

L.Jcnc, {JlJLVl"'T

l,V[. ll

I

IV!

States have a broad range of legal t.ools to enforce thefr clrunk-driving
laws and to secu1'e BAC evidence without
undertaking·- warrantless
.
nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted
implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating
a mot,or vehicle within the Stato, to consent to BAC testing if they are
nnosted or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-dtiving offense.

Id. at 156fi.
The McNeely Cou1·t also cited Sou.th Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).

In Neville; the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed ce1tafr1 aspects of South Dakota's
implied consent law. Id. The Supreme Court found that the law allowed a one-year

c1:v,:l 1·evocation of a driver's license for refusal to allow testing after the drivm was
given an opportunity for

H

hearing. Id., 459 U.S. at f>HO. The Supreme Court then

stated succinctly: "Such penalty for refusing to take blood-alcohol test is
1

:,

unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections." id.
However, the U.S. Supreme Com't further stated in a footnote:
Even though the officers did not specifically advise respondent that the
teat results could be used against him in court, no one would seriou13ly
contend that his foilu1·e to warn would make the test results
inadmissible, had respondent choi;;en to submit to the test ....
While the State did not actually warn respondent that the test results
could he used against him [in a criminal trial), we hold that iiuch fl
failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promiBe to fo1·ego tisc of
evidence t,ha.t would unfairly r't.rick" respondent; if the evidence were
hi.ter offered against him at trial....

Id., 459 U,S. at 565 n. 16, 566.
Given t;hat McNeely specifically refe:tenees Neville, it does not require the
invalidation of t,he consent to bt·eath test in a criminal case. ThiR Court is troubled
by the advisory _warning's failure to inentio:q. thf!t the bt'eath test administered may
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be used in a criminal prosecution. Were it not for the controlling precedent of South

Da,kola u. Neville, and the U.S. Supreme Court)s tacit recognition of the continuing
vrnbil~t,y of Neville, this Court wonld find that Nauerfs eonse:nt was invalidated by a

failure to wa1·n him of the crim1:nal consequences of taking and foiling the breath
test.ii It. is not: possible to conclude that Nauert's consent was knowing, intelligent,
or voluntary absent t:he footnote in Neville. Howevet\ this Court is constrained by
the decifiion of the United States Snpreme Com·t in Neville, whete the justices
determined that officers need not specifically warn a driver that; alcohol test results
may be used against him in a criminal trial. Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 n, Ht As a

result, this Court must conclmle that Nauerfs consent was valid fot the purposes of
criminal prosecution} and the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying the motion to
RUpprOSS.

The Magistrate Judge Erred In Denying Naucrt's Motion in Limi11e,
Because the State Did Not Offer the Breath Testing Evidence Through a
Valid Alternative to Expert Testimony Under the Rules of Evidence
The gravamen of Nauert's motion in liminc is that the SOPs m1d manuals,
formulated by the ISP to implement the statute8 authorizing breath-testing and its

admissibility in eourt, have never been adopted as rules. Becaiu,e of t,he ISP's
failure to promulgate rules, the procedures required to establish the reliability of
the -breath testing were not fulfilled and the magistrate judge should have rejected
J It should be pointed out that a driver in Nauert's situation is not entitled to the advice of coun~d under
the circumstances. Matter of McNeely, 119 Tdaho 182,189,804 P.2d 911, 9HI (Ct. App. 1990); J.C.§ 188002(2). As a result, Naµert was never informed of the legal consequences he faced in a crimmal
prosecution and ht) was deprived of the ability to be apprised of the consequences by j:lis lawye1·.
Consequently, it is h,ud to understand how Nuuerfs consent was knowiug, intelligent, or voluntary.
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tho results of Na.uert's breath testing when challenged through the motion in

liminc. This Court agrees that whateve:r else can be said of the SOPs and manuals
they are not '~rules" and therefore d.o not have the effect of rules. Consequently, the
magistrate judge erred when he denied Nauert's motion _1n limine.

Idaho Code§§ 18-8002A(3) and 18-8004(4) Jmrportcdly exercise the state
legii,lat,ure's power to regulate the admission of alcohol testing evidence in DUI

cases. 3 These statutes confer upon tho ISP, an executive branch agency, t,he
"rosponsib1lity fo1· authorizing alcohol content testing ptocedures ..." State v.

:~ LC § 18~8002A(3) stat.c-s:
Rulemakjng authority of U1e Idaho st."ltc police. The Idaho state police may, pursuant lo
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho C9dc, pre11cribe by rule:
(a) What testing is required lo complete evklentiary testing under this section; and
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to comply with
the dcpartrnent1s requirements. Any 1•ules of the Idaho st.ate police shall be in accordance
with the following: a lest for alcohol (:oncentration in breath a:. defined in section 18-8004,
Idaho Code, and subsection (l)(e) of thir; .-,ection will be valid for the purposes of this
section if the bre<'!th akohol testh1g instmment wa.-. approved for tcstine by the Idaho
state police in acconlance with .section 18-8004, ldaho Code, at any time within ninely
(90) days before the evidenliary lest:iug. A test for alcohol concentratiqn in blood or urine
as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Cod(•, that is reported by the Idaho state police or by
any laboratory ,:1pprnved by the Idaho state police to perform this test will be valid for
lhe pu1·poses of th.is section.

I.C § 18-8004(4) states:
l 1or purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based
upon a formuhi of L,rams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubk centimeters of blood, per
two hundred ten (210) liters of breath m sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of
blood, urine or breath for the purpmJe of del:ermi.nh1g the alcohol concentration ~hall be
perfornu~d by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a labora.tory
approved by the Idaho slate police under the provisions of approval and certification
sta:ndards to be set by that department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho
state police. Notwithstanding t1ny other provjsion of Law or rule of court, tbe resulls of
any test for akoJ10l corn::entration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by 1:1. labomlory operated or approved by the
Idaho state police or by any other method approved by t11c Idaho state police shall bl:!
admissible h1 any p1·oceeding in this state without the necessity of producinB" a witness to
establish the reliabWity of the Lesting procedure f9r cxam_ination.
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Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, _ - _ , 306 P.3d 219, 227-2H (Ct. App. 2013) (discussing
State u. Belli 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988)).
Under this statuto1·y duty and authority, the ISP has generated
administi·ative rules, the SOPs, and the breath testing manuals. The ISP has

ptomulg·atcd IDAPA 1L03.01.014.03, which reads afl follows:
Breath tests shall be administered in conformity with standards
established by the department. Standards shall be developed fot each
type of breath testing instrument used in Idaho, and such standards
shall be isrmed in the form of analytical methods and standnrd
ope1·ating procedures. [Effective] (4-7-11)

The SOPs and mainmls are not contained in JDAPA 11.03.01. Neither are
they fonnally incorporated by reference in that chapter. 4

No court has ever

determined that the SOP8 and manuals constitute "rules') for purposes of the APA.
Besm.v, 155 Idaho at

IL

2, SOG P.3d at 225, .225 n. 2 ("[Tlhe Idaho State

Police agency is charged with prescribing by rule approved equipment for testing

b:renth alcohol content and standa1·ds for administration of such teBtf::l. We have
treated [the SOPs and manuals] as 'rules) for the J)Ul'posc of judicial review because

the parties have done so and because they constitute the only materials by which
the ISP has purportedto authorize testing insti·uments and methods .... We have
11ot, however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually constitute 'rules' or that

On the 0U1er hand, under IDAPA 11.03.01.004 the ISP has formally incorporated a list of nmforming
breath testing devices whkh have been approved by the ISP. This action superseded the dC'ci~io-n of the
Court uf Appeals in Alford, which said that approval of brealh testing <levkes was not an .ig<s~ncy action
subject to the r~qulrements of the APA State v. Alford, l m; Idaho 595, 597-98, H:l P.3d 139, 141-42
(Ct. App. 200t1).
-1
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the ISP has 'prescribed by rule) testing instruments and method1, as cont,emplatccl
by [statute]; that.issue has nevet been presented to this Court.").
In Besaiv, the Court of Appeals reco~nized that the1·e was "tl'Oubling
information about the manner in which the SOPs for breath testing have been
developed or amended ..." Besaw, 306 P .3d at 229. The Court of Appeals found
that certain "cmailB and memos to and from ISP [were] distu:tbing [because they]
lacked any apparent regard for the way proposed changes could affect the validity of
the tests." Id. The Besaw court disapproved of tho apparent objective of ccrtam ISP
personnel to ''thwa1·t all possible defense challenges to the admission of breath tests
tather than to adopt standanls that will maximize the accut·acy of tests upon which
individuals may he convicted of serious crimes and deprived of their liberty.'' Id.
The court alt=m noted that the1·e seemed to be "a conscious avoidance of flny
opportunity for suggestions or ctitiques from persons outside the law enforcement
community." Id. In a footnote, the Court of ApJ)eals explained that avoidance of
scrutiny for the SOPs would be impossible if they had been promulgated acco1·ding

to the APA. Id. at 229 n. 5.
Under the APA, an administrative rule implementing a statute m1.rnt undergo
a specific process to become final, and given the force ancl effect oflaw. The SOPs

and manuals have not bocn promulgntecl to comport with APA rulemaking'
requirements. The ISP p1·ovides no notice in the administrative bulletin before the
SOPs and manuals are adopted (as required by LC.§§ 67-5220 and 67-5221); the
ISP accepts no public comments and holds no public hearing on tho SOPs (al':'!
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mqufrcd by I.C. § 67"5222); the ISP does not, submit the SOPs to a11y legislative
review (as required by LC.§§ 67-5223 and 67-5291). Certainly, :from a procedurnl
· and legal standpoint, the SOPs and manuals are not administrative rules.
· Given that the SOPs and manuals have never been efitnhlishcd as "rules," the

question facing this Court is a matter of first impression: Are the SOPs and
mnntrnls valid authority which enable the admiesion of Nauert's breath testing
without expert testimony? To answer that inquiry, this Com·t musL aRk the

unavoidable question of what; t;he SOPs and manuals 1:n·e: Since they are not rules,

wh~it legal effect do they have?
Because the SOPs and mantrnls are not rules, they cannot be given the force
and effect of law g-enerally ascribed to administrative rules. J\tfead) 117 Idaho at
664, 791 P.2d at 414. The SOPs are, at most, internal guideline8 or standards. See
Service Employee8 lnt'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, lOG

, Idaho 75H, 75fJ, 683 P.2d 404, 407 (H)84) (reaffirmed in Nation v. State, Dept. of
Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d !)53 (2007)). Ae int,e1·nal guidelines, the SOPfi

and .munuals may be changed with impunity by the ngency head whenever hH
choosea, and nre not vetted by anyone other than the ISP. Internal guidelines do

not have the force and effect of law. Id. They can only govern the internal
management of an agency and cannot affect p1·ivate rights or pruc<~dures available
to the public. Id. As H ·result, internal guideline8 arc also incopoble of affecting the
Rules of Evidence.
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The APA provides no saving support for the authority of the SOPs and

manuals. As defined by l.C. § 67~5201(21), a "standai·d" is:
[A] n11-111ual, guideline, criterion, specification, requirement
measurement or other authoritative principle providing a moliel 01·
pattern in comparison with which the correctness or app1·opriatencss of
specified actions, practices or procedures may be determined.
Without incorporation by reforcnce and in compliance with the APA, the SOPs and

manuals have no legal effect beyond tho management of the ISP. At moBt, the
SOPi,, and manuals

a1·0

unincorporated standards, manuals, and internal

guidehnes, nothing more. As a result they have no power to give cffoct to LC. §§ 188002A(3) and 18-8004(4). It is inexplicnble that such an insubstantial basis could
divert the course of the judiciary in the manner it has. Nevertheless, that is where
we now ni·e.
What the ISP has done is, in effect, con8truct an end run around the APA and
ultimately the Rules of Evidence. If the ISP were required to follow rule making
procedures, the SOPs and manuals would at least be subject to outside scrutiny. To
the extent they are arbitrary or capricious, they could.be r,;,truck down. LC.§ 67527B. vVhile the state legislature is not required to pi-escdbe standards Lo control
an agency's rulemaking discretion, the legislntion itself 01' the agency's intc1·nal
guidelines should provide "meaningful safegum·cL.;; against arbitrary decision
making" such as a right to a hearing or juclicial review. Sun Valley Co. v. City of

Sun Valle,y, 109 Idaho 424, 4i8, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985) (abrogat,ed on other
gtouncls). As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, in Besaw, there is "troubling
information about the mnnner in which the SOPs for breath testing have beBn
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developed or umended ... " Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, 306 P.Bd at 22H. This
conclusion is especially disconcerting when it is remembered that, t,he results of the

breath test effectively
. create stl'ict liabilitv for a driver whose breath test shows an
~

alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The result of where we are today is that there

is

110

8cientific support fol' the processes to be employed in administering a test t.hat

holds a driver Htrict.ly liable for driving unde1· the influence. Not only is this result

prohibited by our Rules of Evidence, it also fails to meet the requirement of
fundamental fairness.

As the process currently stands, thete are no "meaningful safeguards" to
ensm~e that the SOPs ate nejther odlitrary nor capricjous. (In fact, the Court of

Appeals has cast serious doubt on t;he SOPs and man:uaJs because they seem to be·
promulgated in a way to avoid scrutiny.· Besaw, 155 Idaho a t _ i 30G P.3d at 229.)
There is no indication whatsoever that the legislature itsolf exercises any oversight

of the development of the SOPs and manuals. Without overnight, the1·e is no
agsurance that the SOPs and manuals are anything other than self-serving.
Given that tlle SOPfi and manuals are not rules, they cannot supplant the
Rules of Evidence. (They also cannot abrogate the separation ofpowet'8 doctl'ine or
the requirement of due process, hut those are other issues.) I.RE. 1102 makes it
. clear that statuteR and rules cannot affect the Rules of Evidence: "Statutory
provisions and rules governing the admissibility of evidenCl=!; to the extent they m·e
evidentinry and to the extent that they are in conflict with aJ)plicablc rules of Idaho
Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect." With that as a i,tai-t;ing point, it is a
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fortiori that the SOPs and manuals, which are neither statutes nor rules, could
somehow effect a change of the rules of evidence in the way sought, If F.tatutcs and
rules cannot alte1· the Ruleri of Evidence, something that has never been

promulgated as a rule Burely cannot affect the Rules of Evidence.

The aclmissibility of evidence is a matter within the inherent judicial iJowe1· of
the Idaho Supreme Court to establish rules and procedures. Idaho Const., Art. V,
§§ 2, 13; LC.§ 1-212 (recognizing the judiciary's i11herent powers); and I.R.Jt 1102
(which reflects the judiciary's primacy when it comes to matter8 of evidence:
"Statutory provisions and 1·ules governing the admissibility of evidence, to the
extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with
applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect.~'), The
legiidature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its powers, but may l'Cgulate by

law, when necessiu:y, the methods of proceeding in the cxcrcjse of those 1wwers of

all the courts inferior to the Supreme Com-t, so long as it does not conflict wit'h the
state constitution. Idaho Const., Al't. V, § 13. The Rules of Evidence may only be
amended l)y the Supreme Coiu.·(;, Art. V, § 13 does not give the legislature the
ability to modi(y those Rules of Evidence. Indeed, "to the extent, th11t the rule [of
evidence] places greater strictures upon the use of such evidence thnn does the
statute 1 the 1·ulc must gove1·11." State v. Rick,s; 122 Idaho 856, 860, 840 P.2d 400,
404: (Ct. App. 1992).

The Cmut of Appeals has, somewhat inexplicably, concluded that I.C. § J 88002A(3) simply pt'ovidcs an alternative method to satisfy the foundational
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requirements fol' scientific testimony in the Rules of Evidence. State v. Nicli~erson,

182 Idaho 406, 410-11, 973 P.2d 758, 762-63 (Ct;, App. 1999). However, the car;e
law upon which Nickerson 1·elies makes it clear that the statutes havo not done

away with foundational requirements. See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho BG, 30, 764 P.2d
113, 117 (Ct. App. 1988):
The acceptance by the Legislature of test proeedures as designated by
the Idaho Dcpai·tment of Health and Welfare clocs not wholly eliininote
the need of establishing foundational requirements for a test result.
This is required even in light of the legislative directive to ut;ili'l..e an
expedient means to admit such evidence. The adoption of the
par'ticular test p1·ocedure merely recognizes the validity and 1·elinbility
of that particular accepted test. It must still be established at trial
that those procedures which ensm·c the reliability aml in turn the
accuracy of the teflt have been met.
What has been happening with the SOPs and manuals as of late is more than just a
legislative fiuhstitute for scientific reliability. The fact of the matter i1:1 that the ISP

is now vested with the unilateral powe1· to prescl'ibe the admission of breath testing
evidencE• in Idaho's courts. As a result, this statute violates the separations of
powers doctrine. Sta.te v. Moore, 150 Idaho 17, 20, 244 P.3d 161, 164 (2010) "The
sepa1·ation of powers doctrine ombodies the concept that the three b1·anches of
government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct
80

that each is able to operate independent}y." (quoting Sweeney v. Otter, lH) Idaho

135, 139, 804 P .2d 308, 312 (1990)); Estep v. Conun 'rs of Boundary Connty, l~l
Idaho 345, 347, 83t! P.2d 8fi2, 8G4 (1992) "The only exception to the separation of
powers doctrine occurs where the exel'cise of another branch's powor is expressly
dfrect;ed or permitted lJy the constitution."
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It is uni,ettling to think that the ISP is allowed to draft SOPs and manuals
given the force and effect of law without any oversight. This is tantamcmnt to n
wholesale assignment of power to an executive branch agency, when the Supreme
Court has said this is nn a1·ca solely goven1ed by the Court. It is axiomHtic that the
le.gislatum is vested with the authority to make lawi.,, not the executive. Idaho

Coi1st., Art. III,§ 1, Art. II; §1. It is even more 1.msettling to think that the ISP
would be granted the power to dictate the procedural operationfi of the judicial
branch. This is a prerogative the judiciary, nt least in the past, haB been unwilling
to relinquish. R.E. W. Const. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of the Third Judicial Dist., 88 ldaho
.426, 437-38) 400 P.2d 390, 397 (1965); fiee also, In re SRBA Cm,e No. 39576, 128
Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (19H5).
This Court is unwilling to endorse the ISP's unche~ked exercise of power over
the judicial process. The jlldiciary of this state "has consistently acted to protect
against encroachment of one department of government on another." lvlead, l 17
Idaho at 669, 791 P.2d at 419. In deciding cases and controve1·sics the judiciary
must he mindful of the ''endudng consequences upon the hnlanccd power structm·e"
of out· democratic system. Id. (quoting the U.S. Supt·eme Court's opinion in

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sau1yer, :343 U.S. 579 (1952)). The ISP cannot
unilatmally direct what foundation, if any, is 1·equircd for the admisBion of breath
test evidence in Idttho'r:; courts. Yet the eurre11t system amounts to tho functional
equivalent of a transfer of that authority.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

15

CONCLUSION
For the reasoni!l stated above, this Court concludes that the Magjst,t·ate Judge
erred in overruling Nauert's challenge to the admissibility of Naucrt's breath test
results without an adequate foundation being laid. Accordingly, tho Order Denying
tho Motion Limine is reversed and the case remanded for furthe.t· proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Datecl this

r~

.$ day of tlnly 2014.

~·(2A;s;;-.-

J~tegne1'
District Judge
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Glossary
Approved Vendor: A source/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distribution within Idaho.
Breath Alcohol Test: A series of separate breath samples provided during a breath testing sequence.
Breath Alcohol Testing Sequence: A sequence of events as detennined by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services, which
may be directed by either the instrument or the operator, but not both, and may consist of air blanks, performance
verification, internal standard checks, and breath samples.

Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An operator who has completed an advanced training class taught by an employee of the
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the
26th month.

Certificate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for performance verification have
been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS.
Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating that an individual breath alcohol testing instrument has been evaluated by the
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the signature of an Idaho State Police
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument approval.
Changeover Class: A training class for currently certified personnel during which they are taught theory, operation, and
proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument being adopted by their agency. Breath Testing Specialists
attend BTS training that qualifies them to perform BTS duties related to the instrument.

Evidentiary Test: A breath test performed on a subject/individual for potential evidentiary or legal purposes. A distinction
is made between evidentiary testing and community service or training tests performed with the instrument.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS): Formerly known as the Bureau of Forensic Services, the ISPFS is dedicated
to providing forensic science services to the criminal justice system of Idaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the
breath alcohol testing program per IDAPA 11 .Q3 .QI .
MIP/MIC: An abbreviation used to designate minor in possession or minor in consumption of alcohol.
Operator Certification: The condition of having satisfied the training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as
established by the ISPFS. Operator certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th
month.

Operator: An individual certified by the ISPFS as qualified by training to administer breath alcohol tests.
Operator Class: An JSPFS-approved training class for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol operators. Currently
certified Breath Testing Specialists may teach operator classes.
Performance Verification: A verification of the accuracy of the breath testing instrument utilizing a simulator and a
perfonnance verification solution. Performance verification should be reported to three decimal places. While ISPFS uses
the term performance verification, manufacturers and others may use a term such as "calibration check" or "simulator check."
Performance Verification Solution: A premixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The
solution is provided by and/or approved by ISPFS.

Recertification Class: A training class for currently certified personnel, completion of which results in uninterrupted
continuation of their Operator or BTS status for an additional 26 months.
Waiting Period/Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period: 15-minute period prior to administering a
breath alcohol test, in which an officer monitors the test subject/individual.
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
List of Revisions
SOP Section

Topic

Date of Revision

2

Delete reference to ALS

June 1, 1995

2

0.02/0.20 solutions

June l, 1995

3.2.1

Valid breath tests

October 23, 1995

2.1

Alco-Sensor calibration checks

May I, 1996

2.2

Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks
Effective June, 1996

May 1, 1996

2.1.2

0.003 agreement

June 1, 1996

2.1.2

Operators may run calibration checks

July 1, 1996

2.1.2

Re-run a solution within 24 hours

September 6, 1996

2.1

All 3 solutions run within a 24-hour period

September 6, 1996

2

All 3 solutions run within a 24-hour period

September 6, 1996

2.1.2

Re-running of a solution

September 26, 1996

2.1

All solutions run within a 48-hour period
Reference to "three" removed

September 26, 1996
Oct. 8, 1996

2

All 3 solutions run within a 48-hour period

September 26, 1996

2

More than three calibration solutions

October 8, 1996

2

Solution values no longer called in to BFS

April 1, 1997

2.1

Alco-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000
calibration check

August 1, 1998

2.2

Calibration checks for the Intoxilyzer 5000

February 11, 1999

Name change, all references made to the
Bureau of Forensic Services were changed to
Idaho State Police Forensic Services.

August 1999

1.6

Record Management

August 1, 1999

2

Deleted sections on relocating, repairing, recalibrating,
and loaning of instruments from previous revision.

August 1, 1999
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1.2, 2.1, 2.2
3

Alco-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples
for alcohol determination

August 1, 1999
August I, 1999

1.6

Operator certification record management

January 29, 2001

1,2, and 3
2.1, 2.2

Reformat numbering
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution

August 18, 2006

2.2. I .1.2.2

Changed 3-sample to "two print cards".

November 27, 2006

2.2.1.1.2.2
2.1.2.1 and 2.2.4

Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards".
Simulator temperature changed from "should"
to "must".

May 14, 2007

2.2.1.1.2.2

Clarification of 0.20 calibration checks.

September 18, 2007

1.2

Added the Lifeloc FC20

February 13, 2008

1.5

Deleted requirement that the new instrument
utilize the same technology if the BTS is currently
certified

February 13, 2008

2

May 14, 2007

Modified the accepted range for simulator solutions to
+/- 10%, eliminating the +/- 0.0 I provision. Added

"Established target values may be different
from those shown on the bottle label"

February 13, 2008

2.2

Added Lifeloc FC20 calibration checks
Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration is now section 2.3

February 13, 2008

2.

Modified to specifically allow use of the 0.20
during subject testing

February 13, 2008

Sections 1, 2, 3

General reformat for clarification. Combined
Alcosensor and Lifeloc sections. Specifically,
changed calibration requirement using the 0.20
reference solution from four (4) checks to two (2).

December 1, 2008

2.1.4, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5
And2.2.10

Clarification: a "calibration check" consists of a
pair of samples in sequence and both samples
must be within the acceptable range before
proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution
should be replaced every 20-25 samples. Clarified
the correct procedure for performing a calibration check.

January 14, 2009

2.1.3, 2.1.4.1, 2.1.9

Clarification: Added "before and after" to the 0.080 and
0.200 calibration checks, within 24 hours of a subject test.
The official time and date of the calibration check is the
time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date
recorded in the log, whichever corresponds to the calibration
check referenced in section 2.1.3 or 2.1.4.1.

July 7, 2009
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History Page
Revision#

Effective date

History

0

8/20/2010

The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding
performance verifications, and to clear-up ambiguities associated with
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an 188004c charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubleshooting,
MIP/MIC sections added.
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved Breath Testing
Instruments
Contents:
Section 2: Scope

page 7

Section 3: Safety

page 7

Section 4: Instrument and Operator Certification

page7

Section 5: Performance Verification of Approved Breath Testing Instruments

page 10

Section 6: Evidentiary Testing Procedure

page 13

Section 7: Troubleshooting

page 15

Section 8: MIP/MIC Procedure

page 16
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved
Breath Testing Instruments.

1

2

Scope
This method describes the Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS)
procedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the analysis of breath for the
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath testing instrument. This
method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol.
Following all the recommendations of this external procedure will establish the
scientific validity and set the unquestioned foundational admissibility of the breath
alcohol test. Failure to meet all of the recommendations within this procedure does not
disqualify the breath alcohol test, but does allow for the questioning of the breath alcohol
tests as it pertains to its foundation of admissibility in court. That foundation can be set,
through testimony, by a breath testing specialist expert or ISPFS expert in breath testing
as to the potential ramifications of the deviation from the procedure as stated.

3

Safety
Within the discipline of breath alcohol testing, the general biohazard safety
precaustions should be followed. This is due to the potential infectious materials that
may be ejected from the mouth during the sampling of the breath. Caution should be
taken so as the expired breath is not directed towards the officer or other unrelated
bystander. ·

4

Instrument and Operator Certification
To ensure that minimum standards are met, individual breath testing instruments,
operators, and breath testing specialists (BTS) must be approved and certified by the
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and maintain a
list of approved instruments by manufacturer brand or model designation for use in the
state.
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4.1

Approval of Breath Testing Instruments. In order to be approved and certified
each instrument must meet the following criteria:
4.1.1 The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test standard,
the results of which must agree within +/- 10% of the target value or such
limits set by ISPFS.
4. 1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate for the
analyses of breath specimens for the determination of alcohol
concentration for law enforcement.
4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and adequately evaluate the
instrument to give accurate results in routine breath alcohol testing.

4.2

The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instrument by serial number from
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof.

4.3

Operators become certified by completing a training class taught by an ISPFS
certified Breath Testing Specialist (BTS). Certification is for 26 calendar months
and expires the last day of the 26th month. Certification will allow the operator to
perform all functions required to obtain a valid breath alcohol test. It is the
responsibility of the individual operator to maintain their current certification; the
ISPFS will not notify operators that their certification is about to expire.
4.3.1

Recertification for another 26-month period is achieved by completing an
ISPFS approved Operator class prior to the end of the 26th month.

4.3.2 If the individual fails to satisfactorily complete the class (including the
written and practical tests), or allows their certification status to expire,
he/she must retake the operator class in order to become re-certified.
4.3.3 If current Operator certification is voided, the individual is not certified to
run evidentiary breath alcohol tests on the instrument in question until the
operator class is completed.
4.3.3.1 There are no grace periods or provisions for extension of operator
certification.
4.4

Breath Testing Specialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an
advanced training class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument
maintenance, and provide both initial and recertification training for instrument
operators.
4.4.1

To obtain initial BTS certification, an individual must be currently
certified as an Operator of that particular instrument. BTS certification is
then obtained by completing an approved BTS training class.

4.4.2

Certification is valid for 26 calendar months.
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4.5

4.6

4.4.3

If BTS certification is allowed to expire, the individual reverts to certified
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument. He/she may
no longer perform any BTS specific duties relating to that particular
instrument.

4.4.4

BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training
class.

4.4.5

The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS certification for
cause. Examples may include falsification of records, failure to perform
required performance verification, failure to successfully pass a BTS recertification class and failure to meet standards in conducting operator
training.

Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will require updating any BTS and
Operators in that agency in the use of the new instrument.
4.5.1

A currently certified BTS may become a certified BTS for a new
instrument by completing an ISPFS approved BTS Instrumentation class.

4.5.2

A currently certified Operator may certify on a new instrument by
completing an ISPFS approved Operator Instrumentation Class for the
new instrument.

4.5.3

Individuals not currently certified as Operators must complete an
Operator Class for each approved instrument.

Record maintenance and management.
It is the responsibility of each
individual agency to store performance verification records, subject records,
maintenance records, instrument logs, or any other records as p~rtaining to the
evidentiary use of breath testing instruments and to maintain a current record of
operator certification.
4.6.1

It is the responsibility of the agency to see that the said records are stored
and maintained a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAPA
11.03.01.
4.6.1.1 Records may be subject to periodic review by the Idaho State
Police Forensic Services.

4.6.2

The Idaho State Police Forensic Services will not be responsible for the
storage of such records not generated by ISPFS.
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5.

Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State
Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is
functioning correctly. Perfonnance verifications are performed using a wet bath
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of the
solutions used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISP established target values may be different
from those shown on the bottle label.

5.1

Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 - Portable Breath Testing Instrument
Performance Verification
5.1.I

The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS.

5.1.2

The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 perfonnance
verification solutions consist of two samples separated by air blanks.

5.1.3

A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20
instruments using a 0.08 performance verification solution must be
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be
covered by a single performance verification.
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every
calendar month, whichever comes first.

5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25
verifications.
NOTE: The 0.020 performance verification was implemented for the sole
purpose of supporting the instruments results for an 18-8004c charge. In
the absence of an I 8-8004c charge, the 0.20 verifications, or lack thereof~
shall have no relevance to the results or the evidentiary value of the
evidentiary test.
5.1 .4.1

The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an
evidentiary test. The 0.20 performance verification solution should
not be used routinely for this purpose.
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5.1.5

Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of
samples in sequence that are both within +/- I 0% of the performance
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series,
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS.
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a
performance verification solution (examples include: ambient air
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the
initial performance verification may not be within the acceptable
range, therefore the performance verification may be repeated until
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However, if results after
a total of three runs for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are
still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The
instrument should not be used for evidentiary testing until the
problem is corrected and performance verification results are
within the acceptable range. The suggested troubleshooting
procedure should be followed if the initial performance verification
does not meet the acceptance criteria.

5.1.6

Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.5°C and 34.5°C in order
for the performance verification results to be valid.
NOTE: The simulator may need to warm for approximately 15 minutes to
insure that the metal lid is also warm. If the lid is cold, condensation of
alcohol vapor may occur producing low results.

5.2

5.1.7

Performance verification solutions should only be used prior to the
expiration date on the label.

5.1.8

An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at
their discretion.

5.1.9

The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and
date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log,
whichever corresponds to the performance verification referenced in
section 5.1.3 or 5.1.4.1.

Intoxilyzer 5000/EN Performance Verification
Intoxilyzer 5000/EN instruments must have a performance verification with each
evidentiary test. If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for
the lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the
resulting breath samples will be deemed valid for evidentiary use.
5.2.1

Intoxilyzer 5000/EN performance verification is run using 0.08 and/or
0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by
ISPFS.
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5.2.2

During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the Intoxilyzer 5000/EN,
a performance verification will be perfonned as directed by the instrument
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout. If the SIM
CHK is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtained.

5.2.3

A two sample perfonnance verification using a 0.08 performance
verification solution should be run and results logged each time a
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 perfonnance verification
solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 100
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first.

5.2.4

A two sample performance verification using a 0.20 performance
verification solution should be run and results logged once per calendar
month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 samples.
The same bottle of 0.20 solution may be used for several months.
NOTE: The 0.020 perfonnance verification was implemented for
the sole purpose of supporting the instruments results for a 188,004c charge. In the absence of an 18-8004c charge, the 0.20
verification, or lack thereof, shall have no relevance to the results
or the evidentiary value of the evidentiary test.

5.2.5

Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 perfonnance verification is a pair of
samples in sequence that are both within +/- 10% of the performance
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable
results for each solution lot series are included in a certificate of analysis,
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS.
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a
perfonnance verification solution (examples include: ambient air
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the
initial performance verification may not be within the acceptable
range, therefore the perfonnance verification may be repeated until
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained however, if results after a
total of three runs for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are still
unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The
instrument should not be used for evidentiary testing until the
problem is corrected and perfonnance verification results are
within the acceptable range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting
procedure if the initial performance verification does not meet the
acceptance criteria.

5.2.6

The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and
date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log.
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5.2.7

Performance verification solutions should only be used prior to the
expiration date as marked on the label.

5.2.8

Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.5°C and 34.5°C in order
for the performance verification results to be valid.

5.2.9 An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at
their discretion.
5.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and performance
verification solution lot number in the instrument before proceeding with
evidentiary testing.

6. Evidentiary Testing Procedure
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is necessary in order to provide accurate
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath.

6.1

Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. Any material which absorbs/adsorbs
or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to the start of the 15
minute waiting period. During the monitoring period the subject/individual should
not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate.
NOTE: If a foreign object/material is left in the mouth during the entirety of the
15 minute monitoring period, any potential external alcohol contamination will
come into equilibrium with the subject/individual's body water and/or dissipate so
as not to interfere with the results of the subsequent breath alcohol test.
6.1.1

The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently
certified in the use of the instrument used.

6.1.2

False teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or
physician do not need to be removed to obtain a valid test.

6.1.3

The operator may elect a blood test in place of the breath alcohol test if
there is a failure to complete the fifteen minute monitoring period
successfully.

6.1.4

During the monitoring period, the operator must be alert for any event that
might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test.
6.1.4.1 The operator must be aware of the possible presence of mouth
alcohol as indicated by the testing instrument. If mouth alcohol is
suspected or indicated, the operator should begin another 15minute waiting period before repeating the testing sequence.
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6.1.4.2 If, during the 15-minute waiting period, the subject/individual
vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the
subject/individual's breath pathway, the 15-minute waiting period
must begin again.
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute
monitoring period, the officer should look at results of the
duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol
contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2.

6.2

A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allow for the dissipation of
potential mouth alcohol contamination.
NOTE:· A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically
invalidate a test sample.
6.2.1

If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third
adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single test result may be
considered valid.
6.2.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by
circumstances.
6.2.1.2 The operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests.

6.2.2

A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ by more than
0.02.
6.2.2.1 Unless mouth alcohol is indicated or suspected, it is not necessary
to repeat the 15-minute waiting period to obtain a third breath
sample.
6.2.2.2 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the
subject/individual's breath pathway, show consistent sample
delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor
to the breath results.

6.2.3

6.2.4

The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in
court. The log of the results or the instrument printouts can be used as the
official legal record for court purposes.
If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample

as requested by the operator, the results obtained are still considered valid
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by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator.
6.2.5

If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn.

7. Troubleshooting Procedure
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is necessary in order to provide accurate
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath.

7.1

Performance verification:
If, when performing the periodic performance
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits of the verification, the
troubleshooting guide should be used.
NOTE: This is a guide for troubleshooting failed performance
verifications and the procedure is recommended to streamline and isolate
the potential cause of the problem. Strict adherence to the guidelines is
not required.
7.1.1

The three sources of error when performing the periodic performance
verifications are in the simulator setup and operator technique, the
simulator performance verification solution, and the instrument calibration
itself.

7.1.2

If the first performance verification fails, the simulator setup and
technique of the operator performing the verification should be evaluated.
The simulator should be evaluated to ensure that it is hooked up properly,
uses short hoses, is properly warmed, is within temperature, the operator
blow technique is not too hard or soft, and that the operator does not stop
blowing until after the sample is taken.
7.1.2.1 The performance verification should be run a second time
7.1.2.2 If the performance verification passes on the second try, the
instrument passes the performance verification.

7.1.3

If the second performance verification fails, then the performance
verification solution should be evaluated.
7.1.3.1 The performance verification solution should be changed to a fresh
solution.
7.1.3.2 The solution should be warmed for approximately 15 minutes, or
until the temperature is within range, and the simulator lid is as
warm as the simulator jar.
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7.1.3.3 The performance verification may then be repeated.

7.2

7 .1 .4

If the third performance verification fails, then the only remaining source
of error lies with the instrument itself. At this point the instrument must
be taken out of service and sent to ISPFS or an approved service provider.

7.1.5

Upon return from service, the instrument should be evaluated by ISPFS
before being put back into service.

Thermometers:
7 .2.1 If a bubble forms in the thermometer, the operator or BTS can place the
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercury (or equivalent) into the bulb of the
thermometer. This should disperse the bubble.

8. MIP/MIC Procedure
Since the testing threshold (presence or absence) for a minor in possession/minor in
consumption charge is different from an 18-8004 charge and the numeric thresholds,
there is a different procedure associated with these special circumstances. In many
instances, an underage drinking party may consist of multiple subjects/individuals that
need to be tested and the sheer number of individuals does not lend itself to observing a
15 minute waiting period for each person. The potential for "mouth alcohol" is still a
factor and should be addressed in the testing sequence.
8.1

15 minute observation period: At the officer's discretion, or as the circumstances
dictate, the regular DUI procedure (Section 6) may be followed in order to obtain
a breath sample from the subject/individual. Otherwise, a shortened procedure
can be followed

8.2

MIP/MIC procedure:
8.2.1 The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently
certified in the use of the instrument used.
8.2.2 False teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or
physician do not need to be removed to obtain a valid test.

8.3

A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allow for the dissipation of
potential mouth alcohol contamination.
NOTE: A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically
invalidate a test sample.
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8.3.1

If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third
adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single test result may be
considered valid.
8.3.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by
circumstances.
8.3.1.2 The operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests.

8.3.2

A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ by more than
0.02.
8.3.2.1 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the
subject/individuals breath pathway, show consistent sample
delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor
to the breath results.

8.3.3

The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in
court. The log of the results or the instrument printouts can be used as the
official legal record for court purposes.

8.3.4

If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample
as requested by the operator, the results obtained are still considered valid
by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator.

8.3.5

If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn.
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